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ABSTRACT 
DHS’s Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is responsible for 
screening potential immigrants to the United States. Loopholes in the process 
allow fraudulent applicants, criminals and terrorists to enter and remain here 
undetected.  Innovative DNA screening technology would help to protect against 
fraud, detect criminals and terrorists, facilitate inter-agency information sharing, 
improve customer service, and save resources.  However, USCIS currently has 
no authority to require DNA testing.  Seeking ways to utilize this technology, I 
conducted research employing various qualitative data collection methodologies, 
such as interviews, observations, and participation in a nationwide DHS-
sponsored survey.  The goal was to develop a policy recommendation regarding 
whether and how to move forward toward expanded DNA testing in the 
immigration process.  I found that maintaining the status quo would leave us 
vulnerable.  USCIS should highlight the benefits of DNA testing to its 
stakeholders and dispel any myths and fears.  It should work with its national and 
international partners to establish standards and achieve interoperability.  To 
protect privacy, USCIS must take great care to safeguard all personal information 
stored in the DNA database. A pilot testing program may offer the opportunity to 
implement DNA testing in phases, and to test, evaluate, and adjust the process 
where necessary.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United States has always welcomed immigrants from around the 
globe who are looking for a better life.  Over the years, our immigration system 
has changed in accordance with the needs of our economy, politics and family 
values.  Although immigrants have enriched our society and enabled our 
economy to grow, they can also pose a potential risk.  Since 9/11, the United 
States has faced the need to look more carefully at loopholes in immigration laws 
that leave us vulnerable to fraud, human trafficking, crime, and terrorism.    
DNA analysis is a cutting-edge technology that has proven value in 
establishing biological relationships and detecting and deterring crime.  It is a 
perfect tool for combating immigration fraud and preventing trafficking in humans, 
especially children.  Because DNA technology is relatively new, laws, regulations 
and policies surrounding DNA testing have not caught up to reflect today’s 
needs.  Current laws and regulations do not provide authority for the U.S. 
government to require DNA testing in the immigration process.  Instead, the 
government can only suggest or recommend DNA testing as a last resort.  This 
wastes valuable resources.  Past barriers to streamlined DNA testing have 
included high costs, scarce availability of services, concerns about chain of 
custody, lack of authority, and privacy issues.   
This thesis explores the feasibility of expanding DNA testing to establish 
identity, protect against fraud and human trafficking, and enhance security 
screening for crime and terrorism.  The research included a review of the 
literature, interviews with various subject matter experts, observation of DNA 
testing in Haiti, and participation in the National Dialogue on the Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review. 
Research shows that DNA has unique attributes in the immigration context 
and that costs could be drastically reduced through volume and streamlining of 
DNA testing.  New technology shows promise for portable testing equipment that 
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could bring more integrity to the chain of custody, provide consistent results, 
improve customer service, and make DNA analysis easy, fast, and inexpensive.  
To diffuse DNA technology in the immigration process, the government 
must do several things.  First, DHS, with the help of expert public relation 
professionals, should launch a social conditioning campaign.  Through outreach, 
education, and skillful presentation, they can dispel the myths and promote the 
benefits of DNA technology.  Outreach efforts should assure the public that 
USCIS would use the DNA samples only for the purposes specified, and that 
they will protect the DNA data.  The policy and regulatory development process 
should be transparent.  Another important thing that the government should do is 
invest in standards to achieve interoperability.  This will allow for seamless 
information sharing with local, state, tribal, federal, and international partners.  
Third, the government should consider a pilot DNA testing program.  This would 
allow USCIS to implement DNA testing in phases and test, evaluate, and adjust 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The United States has always welcomed immigrants from around the 
world who are looking for a better life.  Over the years, our immigration system 
has changed in accordance with the needs of our economy, politics, and family 
values.  Immigrants have enriched our society and enabled our economy to 
grow, and the majority of applicants are legitimate seekers of immigration 
benefits.  However, as technology has advanced, globalization has made us 
more vulnerable; the events of 9/11 painfully demonstrate the reality that some 
people wish us harm.  Those who want to harm the United States look for 
loopholes that would provide relative freedom of movement to and within the 
United States. The United States must balance laws and policies intended to 
improve the processing of immigration benefits to ensure that those laws and 
policies also provide adequate screening to protect the American public and the 
security of our nation. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is responsible for adjudicating 
applications and petitions for immigration benefits and consequently represents 
an important line of defense in this context.  
The vast majority of immigrants to the United States qualify based on a 
family relationship.  Some are the direct beneficiaries of a petition filed by a U.S. 
citizen or permanent resident for a spouse, child, parent or sibling.  Others 
immigrate through employment or humanitarian relief.  If one includes all those 
who receive derivative benefits as a qualifying spouse or child of any of the 
above categories of immigrants, most avenues to immigration are actually family-
based.  U.S. citizenship is a highly valued asset, for both economic and political 
reasons, and fraud has long been rampant among applicants for U.S. visas and 
other immigration benefits.  Improvements in modern technology have provided 
the ability for many unscrupulous vendors and applicants to create fraudulent 
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documents that they then use to obtain immigration benefits.  Two-thirds of 94 
known foreign-born terrorists operating in the United States between 1993 and 
2004 entered and sought to remain in America through fraudulent means (Cato, 
2008).  The U.S. Department of State (DOS) issues periodic fraud bulletins that 
highlight family relationship fraud and the easy availability and frequent use of 
false documents.  The Forensic Document Laboratory (FDL), operated by DHS’s 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) component, is overworked and 
cannot verify all suspect documents.  Foreign governments often do not 
cooperate in verifying authenticity; sometimes the very officials who have issued 
the documents received a bribe to do so.  Many foreign countries do not maintain 
adequate records.  This places a burden on applicants and petitioners who feel 
obligated to obtain documents where none may exist.   
USCIS was created in 2003 as a component of the Department of 
Homeland Security.  It derived from the adjudications segment of the former 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a branch of the Department of 
Justice (DOJ). In the past, both USCIS and the INS lagged behind in the use of 
innovative technology to manage the immigration process. At the same time, 
throughout the world, people utilize high-technology computers and printers to 
fabricate documents.  They access the Internet, social networking sites and 
electronic banking to plot against us.  USCIS, meanwhile, has failed to take full 
advantage of available technology to enhance the integrity and security of our 
immigration system and streamline benefits to legitimate applicants.   
Leaving open loopholes that allow potential terrorists, or simply fraudulent 
applicants, to immigrate to the United States not only threatens our security, but 
also creates an economic burden.  When an applicant obtains admission by 
fraud, he is depriving a legitimate applicant from his place in the immigration line.  
Detecting fraud, especially without the use of innovative technology, can be a 
costly and time-consuming process, often requiring multiple requests for 
secondary evidence and lengthy interviews, at times in faraway places.   
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For example, a refugee-processing circuit ride to one West African country 
last year resulted in only a ten percent approval rate, primarily because of 
relationship fraud that USCIS discovered only after extensive screening and 
interviewing.  Most of the refugees in this particular West African caseload fell 
within the Priority Three (P-3) family reunification category.  This category 
requires that a relative who is in the United States as a refugee or asylee file an 
Affidavit of Relationship (AOR) on behalf of the potential refugee applicant 
overseas.  Approval of an AOR provides access to a refugee interview for the 
beneficiary of the AOR.  The beneficiary can then usually include his entire family 
or household for presentation to the refugee screening process.   
The State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 
and the USCIS Refugee Affairs Division manage the U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program.  They base their goals on the number of refugees actually admitted to 
the United States each year, rather than upon the number of refugees 
interviewed.  As a result, their success is contingent on being able to approve 
applicants.  Denials take resources without providing any return.  All refugee 
applicants submit to at least two interviews.  One is with a DOS contractor who 
gathers extensive information and prepares the file; the other interview is with a 
USCIS Refugee Officer.  Refugee officers travel all over the world to conduct 
thorough interviews.  These interviews often take place in very remote and 
sometimes dangerous locations.  The U.S. government cannot manage the 
refugee admissions program efficiently without the capability to verify family 
relationships early on in the process.  With such capability, they could screen the 
fraudulent applicants off at the beginning of the process, without wasting further 
resources to interview and process them.  The legitimate applicants would 
benefit because they would no longer have to wait in line behind all of the 
fraudulent applicants.  They also would avoid the pressures, either for monetary 
gain or under threat of harm, to include bogus persons on their cases and thus 
jeopardize their safety or their eligibility.  Instead, they could reunite with their 
families in the United States much more quickly.  
In 2008, in response to reports of relationship fraud among refugees in the 
P-3 refugee access program, the DOS and USCIS initiated a pilot DNA testing 
program among refugees in East Africa (U.S. Department of State [DOS], 2008).  
After the initial results showed high rates of fraud, the testing expanded to other 
locations in East and West Africa. On average, well over 80 percent of the 
families failed to verify the claimed relationships.  Either they refused testing or 
tests proved fraud in the family composition.  Although no one knows for sure 
why over forty percent refused testing, most people with knowledge of the 
process believe it was because they were afraid that we would detect the fraud.  
Of those with proven fraud who submitted to the testing, the word on the street 
was that they thought they could beat the DNA tests by sharing the same lemon.   
 




Until last year, when USCIS brought large numbers of Iraqi refugees to the 
United States, Somalia represented the largest source country for refugee 
admissions (Kliska, 2008, p. 57). Screening from East Africa is important for our 
national security, as evidenced by the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania and the fact that Somalia has long been a haven for Al-
Qaeda.  The revelation that a Somali-born naturalized U.S. citizen blew himself 
up in a suicide bombing last year in Somalia has raised concerns by the FBI that 
young men of Somali origin are departing the United States to fight and train 
overseas (Spillus, 2009).  These young men could conceivably return, using 
American passports, to commit terrorist acts on U.S. soil.   
DNA has proven value in the ability to verify claimed family relationships 
and thus prevent human smuggling and trafficking.  It also is the gold standard in 
solving and preventing crime and is increasingly being used to fight terrorism.  
Utilizing DNA testing in all of these areas would benefit the security of the United 
States, but USCIS currently lacks the authority to conduct routine DNA testing.   
U.S. immigration laws and regulations as outlined in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) and Title Eight Code of Federal Regulations (8 CFR) 
describe evidence required to prove family relationships for immigrant visa 
petitions.  When a person submits a document in a foreign language, he or she 
must include a certified English translation.  Many applicants and petitioners do 
not possess the required documents, but try to procure them by any means. 
USCIS and its customers spend time and money in an effort to document 
claimed relationships.  Relationship fraud screening interviews are time-
consuming, and the combined process makes it difficult to complete 
adjudications within the target timeframe.   
Current rules outlined in 8 CFR do not allow USCIS to require DNA 
testing; instead, USCIS may only request blood testing, which is outdated and 
unreliable. DNA testing may be “suggested” and accepted when evidence is 
insufficient.  The process is not simple and, in reality, officers often approve 
petitions based on documents for which they are unable to verify the authenticity.     
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B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
What factors might promote the diffusion of innovative DNA technology to 
help USCIS establish identity, protect against immigration fraud and human 
trafficking, and enhance security checks that will protect the public against 
criminals and terrorists?  What are the financial incentives and the benefits of up-
front DNA testing to USCIS stakeholders?  What are the legal and privacy issues 
that USCIS must consider and what policy, regulatory or legislative changes are 
needed to effect such change?  How can interagency collaboration play a role in 
this effort and benefit from it?  What role might DNA testing play in any future 
comprehensive immigration reform? 
C. ARGUMENT 
Since Sir Alec Jeffries first realized the ability to create DNA profiles in 
1984, DNA testing has become the gold standard not only to prove relationships 
but also for forensic identification.  DNA testing is a valuable tool that could help 
DHS establish an alien’s identity early in the process, prove qualifying family 
relationships, and screen aliens for crimes and terrorism.  In the past, DNA 
testing has not been a feasible option because of regulatory language, high costs 
and logistical problems regarding the chain of custody of DNA.  
DNA testing could enable USCIS to capture a person's unique identity 
from the time of his or her first contact with USCIS.  This would protect that 
person from future identity theft and would help prevent impostors from 
successfully applying for benefits under multiple identities.  It would help to 
ensure that beneficiaries of family-based petitions, and derivatives for all 
immigration benefits, have qualifying relationships for the status they are 
seeking.  It will also make the process easier for legitimate family members.  
Since DNA has proven value in solving and preventing crime, USCIS should also 
explore the options of utilizing DNA testing to enhance the security checks 
currently in place in the immigration process.  Before an applicant or petitioner 
may be required to submit to DNA testing, USCIS must change the regulations at 
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8 CFR to allow officers to request DNA.  A possible first step toward such a 
change would be to publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal 
Register and solicit comments from the public before drafting the final rule.  
Congress may also amend laws to allow for DNA testing and may decide to do 
so in conjunction with a future immigration bill.   
USCIS should look for ways to streamline the DNA process in order to 
reduce costs.  This may involve using the USCIS Application Support Centers 
(ASCs) to collect DNA at the same time that they capture fingerprints and 
photographs from applicants.  This process would enable USCIS to manage the 
chain of custody of the DNA samples.  USCIS would need to arrange for 
overseas capture of DNA, possibly through agreements with the Department of 
State, or through expansion of ASC responsibilities overseas.  USCIS should 
consult with the Department of Justice and the Department of Defense (DoD) on 
information-sharing agreements and the feasibility of using DNA to enhance 
security checks.  For any expansion, USCIS must develop protocols and 
standards for storing, managing, and sharing DNA profiles and create a database 
to handle them.   
Applicants for immigration benefits already pay a biometric fee and appear 
in person to provide photographs, signatures and fingerprints.  Fingerprints are 
processed through FBI databases to detect past criminal behavior (U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services [USCIS] “Fact Sheet,” 2006). Since DNA is 
often found at crime scenes when fingerprint evidence is not, DNA testing would 
be a valuable tool for screening potential immigrants.  Following are just three 
examples of criminal cases that demonstrate the value such testing could bring 
to immigrant security checks.  
Angel Resendez — Also known as the “railroad killer,” this Mexican 
national was believed to have killed at least 15 people in multiple states (Preston, 
2007).  He had numerous encounters with the law and with immigration officials, 
had raped many of his victims, and his DNA was found at multiple crime scenes.  
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If his DNA had been collected early on, many of the murders may have been 
prevented.  Instead, he was released repeatedly. 
Deniz Aydiner — This Turkish citizen brutally raped, tortured and 
murdered a young woman in her college dormitory (Bernstein, 2004).  With no 
clear suspects, police took samples from approximately 500 males in the 
community and were finally able to identify Aydiner.  He had married an 
American and was seeking permanent residency in the United States.  Since no 
fingerprints were left at the scene, the routine USCIS fingerprint checks would 
not have identified him as the perpetrator.   
Jose Juan Garcia-Perlera — This citizen of El Salvador was charged with 
multiple home invasion robberies of elderly citizens in the Washington, D.C., area 
(Morse, 2008).  Investigators found his DNA at three of the crime scenes.  His 
crimes escalated, and he murdered one of his last victims.  Had his DNA been on 
file, the police may have caught him before he committed the murder.  
Currently there are nearly seven million DNA profiles in the FBI’s National 
DNA Index System (NDIS), and crime resolution is enhanced exponentially as 
the number of DNA profiles increases. The DoD has at least 80,000 DNA profiles 
(Eisler, 2008), many of them collected from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) 
and terrorism suspects, and INTERPOL’s database contains another 85,000 
DNA profiles from criminals and terrorists (The Hindu News, 2009 and Kellner, 
2008). Utilizing DNA to enhance our security screening process could prevent 
criminals or terrorists from receiving immigration benefits and thereby protect the 
American public.  
Presently, petitioners wishing to use DNA to prove a relationship must 
locate an American Association of Blood Banks (AABB)-certified lab to arrange 
for DNA testing, which currently costs approximately $650.  By the time they 
have reached this point in the process, they and USCIS have wasted precious 
resources trying to confirm the relationship. As the use of DNA testing increases, 
prices will drop considerably. 
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With so many different labs involved in the current process, and no 
certification required overseas, the present DNA collection process lacks integrity 
and is vulnerable to fraud. If USCIS and DOS share responsibility for collection of 
DNA, the chain of custody issues would be resolved and the integrity of the 
process enhanced.   
Last year, USCIS signed a five-year, $500 million transformation contract 
to speed benefits determination, combat identity fraud, and reduce processing 
times by moving from paper-based to electronic processing (IBM, 2008).  
Implementing DNA testing could enhance transformation. On-line filing would 
prompt biometric appointment notices and DNA collected from those 
appointments would enable adjudication of many petitions without the need for 
birth certificates, marriage certificates or secondary evidence, all of which can be 
forged or unreliable.  Although certain applications and petitions would still 
require documents, DNA testing to prove biological relationships would eliminate 
the need for documents in many cases. 
The benefits of diffusing DNA testing in the immigration process are many.  
Streamlining the process would enable USCIS to: 
 Establish identity without a doubt  
 Prove qualifying biological relationships 
 Relieve many petitioners of the need to submit documents  
 Allow for increased electronic filing  
 Speed processing times 
 Enhance security checks by screening for criminals and terrorists  
 Deter fraudulent petitions  
 Protect against human trafficking 
 Free up resources for legitimate applicants 
 Decrease costs considerably, both for USCIS and its stakeholders 
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 Facilitate intergovernmental cooperation  
 Enable law enforcement to solve more crimes and 
 Enhance national security. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
One goal of this research is to determine the feasibility of sharing 
information with the FBI and local, state, tribal, international, and other federal 
partners.  USCIS might accomplish such sharing through the FBI’s NDIS and 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS). The research will include exploration of 
the possibilities for sharing information with the Department of Defense and 
INTERPOL to enable USCIS to improve screening for terrorists and for crimes 
that have been committed outside the United States.  Such information sharing 
will help USCIS determine if an alien is eligible for the benefit he or she is 
seeking.  It will also help U.S. and international partners to solve crimes and 
protect the public.    
Many people have written about the Constitutionality of maintaining DNA 
databases on criminals but not on the issue of maintaining DNA databases on 
immigrants.  This research will consolidate views from those who are involved in 
creating and maintaining DNA databases, as well as from legal experts, and 
others whose cooperation would be necessary to the successful implementation 
of DNA testing in the immigration process.  This will likely promote further 
discussion and actions on the subject, possibly in the context of future 
comprehensive immigration reform.  DNA technology has the potential to enable 
seamless information sharing between DHS and federal, state, local, tribal and 
international partners.  The outcome of this research should provide information 
that will guide decision makers in Congress and in the Departments of Homeland 
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adjustment denied.  If applicant 
in U.S. issue NTA or turn over to 
FDNS or ICE.




Figure 2.   Proposed Process 
 11
 12
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 13
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Sir Alec Jeffreys first developed the ability to create DNA profiles, or 
genetic fingerprints, in 1984 (Whiteman, 2004).  Since then, the technology has 
improved rapidly, but DNA is still a relatively new and emerging technology. DNA 
testing is sometimes a controversial topic in the public eye, with privacy concerns 
competing with DNA’s proven benefits in establishing biological relationships and 
solving and preventing crime.  Literature tying DNA testing to immigration is 
scarce.  However, some reports exist on immigration fraud and terrorism and on 
terrorists’ use of fraud to enter and remain in the United States.  Little has been 
written to highlight the benefits of DNA testing in the immigrations process.  
Literature from a variety of sources is broken down into seven categories below: 
Establishing identity; Immigration fraud and human smuggling and trafficking; 
Crime and terrorism; Financial incentives; Public benefit versus privacy and other 
legal issues; Technology, collaboration and interoperability; and Comprehensive 
immigration reform. 
A. ESTABLISHING IDENTITY 
The National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) explains the use of 
DNA as a biometric identifier on its Web site (n.d.).  It points out that the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and thousands of civil and criminal 
courts have established DNA as a means to link people to their actions.  The 
NDIA considers DNA as much an identifier as fingerprints, retinal scans, face 
recognition and other biometrics.  The Web site noted that government 
standardization, such as the practice of using 13 core loci established by the FBI, 
has ensured consistency and allowed government agencies to use automated 
systems such as CODIS to match DNA.   
The U.S. Department of Energy’s Human Genome Project Information site 
(n.d.) describes short tandem repeat (STR) technology that evaluates nuclear 
DNA.  The FBI requires that DNA profiles run through the Combined DNA Index 
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System (CODIS) must be processed using a standard set of 13 specific STR 
regions (or core loci).  The CODIS software program matches local, state and 
federal DNA profiles from unsolved crime scenes and missing persons to profiles 
identified as belonging to a particular person.  The Web site noted that the odds 
that two individuals will have the same 13-loci DNA profile are about one in a 
billion.   
It is clear that DNA testing is a valuable tool in identifying individuals and 
thus promoting legitimate travel while denying criminals and terrorists the 
anonymity that they seek.  USCIS must look for ways to demonstrate DNA’s 
value to stakeholders.   
B. IMMIGRATION FRAUD AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING 
In a 2008 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, Ruth Wasem 
noted that immigration fraud is widespread, and pointed out the problems USCIS 
faces in combating fraud.  Wasem criticized USCIS’s security checks, including 
their overreliance on names and documents provided by the applicants 
themselves. She noted that international terrorists, organized crime syndicates 
and alien smuggling rings rely on fraudulent documents to minimize detection 
(Wasem, 2008).   
The DOS also frequently highlights fraud vulnerabilities, but many of these 
reports are not available to the public.  However, one DOS report available on 
the Internet that is indicative of fraud throughout the world, (U.S. DOS, Embassy 
of the United States Hanoi Vietnam, 2008) noted the following:  
Fraudulent documents are routinely submitted by Vietnamese 
applicants in both non-immigrant and immigrant visa applications. 
These include both documents that have been fabricated outright 
and official documents issued improperly or based on incorrect 
information. Birth certificates, household registry documents, and 
marriage certificates can easily be purchased from corrupt local 
government officials or brokers. 
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The Center for Immigration Studies (CIS) publishes periodic reports on 
immigration issues.  One, titled “America’s Identity Crisis:  Document Fraud is 
Pervasive and Pernicious” (Dinerstein, 2002), pointed out that the “production 
and distribution of false documents has become a large and sophisticated 
industry.”  The author advocated paying more attention to risk management, 
advising the federal government to follow the lead of private industry and get 
away from paper-based work by using technology to “control risk and ensure 
quality.”  
Human smuggling and human trafficking differ in the sense that, at least at 
first, the smuggled person is a willing actor.  Trafficking involves trickery or 
coercion to facilitate the illegal movement of people, usually against their will, and 
often for purposes of prostitution or forced labor.  Women and children are the 
most common victims of trafficking.  Both human smuggling and human 
trafficking threaten the integrity of the U.S. immigration system.   
In his May 20, 2009, testimony before the U.S. Congress, John Torres, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for DHS’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE), pointed out that human smuggling and trafficking are problems that ICE 
has tackled aggressively.  He noted that organizations often charge thousands of 
dollars to smuggle aliens to the United States, including some aliens who pose a 
threat to our country.  Torres said that ICE has worked to raise awareness of 
modern-day slavery and that they have collaborated closely with other agencies 
and partners to combat international smuggling, trafficking, terrorism and crime.    
An Associated Press article on DNA’s value in preventing human 
trafficking in the international adoption arena described a mother whose baby 
was stolen from her at gunpoint.  Fourteen months later, she spotted the child 
near an orphanage, just before an American couple was to adopt her.  The 
mother insisted on DNA testing and authorities returned her daughter to her 
(Llorca, 2008). 
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The pursuit of DNA testing in the immigration context is not a new idea.  
USCIS currently has no authority to require DNA testing, even when fraud is 
highly suspected.  An April 2006 memo from the CIS Ombudsman1 to the USCIS 
Director recommended expansion of DNA testing to prove family relationships 
(Khatri, 2006).  The Ombudsman noted that DNA provides conclusive scientific 
evidence of family relationships, and that birth records from many countries are 
extremely unreliable.  He said that the lack of standardized DNA testing creates a 
burden on USCIS and its customers because of high costs for testing through 
private labs, and time and money spent on requests for evidence and interviews.  
He recommended that USCIS revise regulations to allow officers to require DNA 
testing, saying this would enhance national security, bring scientific certainty to 
USCIS adjudications, improve customer service, and increase USCIS efficiency.   
A July 2006 response from USCIS Director Gonzalez indicated that 
USCIS was drafting updates to 8 CFR to allow USCIS to require DNA when they 
suspect fraud.  He said that high costs and limited accessibility were reasons that 
DNA evidence had not been required in all cases, but that USCIS would be 
willing to reconsider the issue when and if DNA testing “becomes more available 
and affordable worldwide.”    
The above-referenced literature validates the idea that fraudulent 
document use is widespread and creates vulnerability, and that human 
smuggling and trafficking pose risks to everyone.  New fraud schemes are 
uncovered every day.  As revelations of fraud surface, their exposure serves to 
bolster the argument for DNA testing to establish identity and prove relationships.  
USCIS must seek ways to highlight to its stakeholders the value of DNA in 
combating fraud and thus preventing human smuggling and trafficking. 
 
1 The Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CIS Ombudsman) provides 
recommendations for resolving individual and employer problems with USCIS. As mandated by 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 452, CIS Ombudsman is an independent office that reports 
directly to the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security. The CIS Ombudsman: 1) Assists 
individuals and employers in resolving problems with USCIS; 2) Identifies areas in which 
individuals and employers have problems in dealing with USCIS; and 3) Proposes changes to 
mitigate identified problems. 
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C. CRIME AND TERRORISM 
A USCIS Fact Sheet explaining the security check process (2006) 
describes how USCIS collects fingerprints from potential immigrants and runs 
them through nationwide databases to locate criminal records.  An applicant 
convicted of certain crimes may be inadmissible to the United States, so 
fingerprinting is an important tool.  It enables adjudicators to determine whether 
an applicant is eligible for the benefit that he or she is seeking.  When a person is 
applying for U.S. citizenship, USCIS captures his or her fingerprints and runs 
them through FBI databases again.  An applicant for citizenship must 
demonstrate good moral character (GMC) in order to qualify for naturalization, 
and the fingerprint and name checks help to assess the applicant’s GMC.  
However, fingerprint and name checks are often not enough.  Many people 
provide false names and take care not to leave their fingerprints at crime scenes.  
Often they cannot prevent leaving their DNA at the crime scene. 
Much has been written about DNA’s crime detection and deterrent 
capabilities.  In a proposed rule published in the Federal Register on April 18, 
2008, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) mandated the expansion of DNA 
testing to include those merely arrested for crimes.  It also required federal 
officers to capture DNA from non-U.S. citizens who are detained and 
fingerprinted (U.S. Department of Justice [USDOJ], April 2008).  DOJ highlighted 
the value of DNA testing in bringing the guilty to justice and protecting the 
innocent who might otherwise be wrongly accused, noting that early collection of 
DNA is a valuable method of preventing and deterring crime.  A June 2008 report 
by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) on the effectiveness of performing DNA 
analysis at property crime scenes pointed out that DNA was at least twice as 
effective as fingerprints in identifying suspects.  Highlighting DNA’s international 
crime-fighting value, The Washington Times told the story of an international 
jewel theft ring thwarted when INTERPOL matched DNA samples taken in Dubai 
to those from crime scenes in Liechtenstein, leading them to the arrest of a group 
out of the Balkans (Kellner, 2008).   
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The NDIA Web site (n.d.) highlights the benefits of DNA in identifying 
terrorists.  They pointed out, for example, that latent fingerprints and trace DNA 
are usually deposited on improvised explosive devices (IEDs) during 
construction, transport, and placement.  The evidence can often survive 
detonation and allow for rapid identification of the individuals involved.  Stating 
that the goal of the Department of Defense’s Biometrics Task Force is to “deny 
our adversaries anonymity,” the NDIA argued that DNA provides a strong tool in 
that fight. 
This literature clearly shows that DNA technology would add value in the 
immigration context to enhance security checks.  What is not clear is how USCIS 
might collaborate with other agencies and partners, such as the Department of 
Justice, the Department of Defense, and INTERPOL, to utilize the value of DNA 
technology in screening for crime and terrorism.  How might we gain public 
support for changes to laws, regulations and policies that would allow for such 
expansion of DNA testing by USCIS? 
D. FINANCIAL INCENTIVES 
Although the cost to the government for DNA testing appears to be 
decreasing as its use expands, the cost to the public remains high.  Currently, if 
an applicant or petitioner wishes to use DNA testing to prove a relationship, he or 
she must contract with an American Association of Blood Banks (AABB)-certified 
lab and arrange for the collection of specimens (Aytes, 2008).  DNA testing 
arranged through private laboratories usually costs six or seven hundred dollars.  
For instance, Identigene laboratory charges $649 for an immigration DNA 
paternity test (Identigene, n.d.).  This is in stark contrast to what the government 
says it costs to process DNA.  According to the DOJ’s 2008 proposed DNA rule, 
the cost of a DNA buccal swab collection kit is approximately $7.50.  It costs 
$28.50 to analyze the DNA sample and $1.50 to store the sample, for a total of 
$37.50.  According to an Associated Press article, published April 18, 2009, 
wider adoption of DNA testing could increase efficiency and cut costs. 
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In 2008, the DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) awarded 
three Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) grants to develop a rapid DNA 
desktop prototype device to verify identity and kinship.  The expected outcome 
will be a device able to process DNA in under an hour for less than $50 that 
would aid in immigration cases and in mass casualty identifications. The device 
should  “perform all of the necessary steps to extract, purify, amplify, separate, 
detect, and compare DNA without human intervention and to present a simple 
match or non-match result to the operator” (Goodwin, 2008).  The results have 
been promising.  It is clear that costs of DNA testing will continue to drop as the 
technology improves and the government takes more control over the process. 
Experience shows that without the ability to verify relationships the 
government will continue to waste limited resources to obtain documents and 
conduct interviews to determine eligibility.  Costs of DNA testing vary widely, but 
USCIS may be able to greatly reduce the current price that applicants and 
petitioners must pay for DNA testing.  USCIS should further explore ways to 
streamline the process in order to reduce costs.  A future cost-benefit analysis 
may be useful to determine at what point it becomes cheaper for USCIS to 
conduct DNA testing for everyone. 
E. PUBLIC BENEFIT VS. PRIVACY AND OTHER LEGAL ISSUES 
Although DNA has proven crime-fighting ability, privacy remains an area 
of concern.  In The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics, Michael Smith (2006) 
argued that databases that are more inclusive resulted in more crime resolutions 
and saved time by quickly ruling out possible suspects.  He said that the 
standard method of analyzing 13 core loci results in the ability to distinguish a 
person from all others except an identical twin, but does not reveal any features 
or traits.  Expanding the DNA database to include our entire population, Smith 
opines, would advance not only our public safety, but also our privacy.  He noted 
that Fourth Amendment challenges to DNA databases have not held up, and that 
maintenance of DNA databases is justified in the interests of the efficient 
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investigation of future crimes.  To the argument that it is not fair to store DNA 
profiles of those never convicted of a crime, he pointed out that 57 percent of 
those arrested for rape in a given year have never been arrested on a felony 
charge and 42 percent have never been arrested at all.  Although the author 
goes so far as to recommend DNA collection on everyone at birth, he argues that 
the government should then destroy, rather than store the samples, to prevent 
abuse or threats to privacy.   
Robert Williamson and Rony Duncan expressed similar opinions in an 
article in the journal Nature (2002).  They advocated taking DNA samples from 
everyone at birth, noting that DNA is a powerful technology in fighting crime and 
that as long as safeguards are in place there is no reason not to put all persons 
in the database.  The safeguards they argued for are that no one should retain 
the DNA samples and that the police should not control the databases where the 
profiles are stored. 
In the 2002 BBC article “Privacy fears over DNA database,” the man who 
discovered genetic fingerprinting, Sir Alec Jeffreys, criticized the British 
Government’s decision to store DNA profiles of persons arrested but not 
convicted of crimes.  He considered it discriminatory and instead advocated for 
the analysis and storage of the profiles of the entire United Kingdom population.  
He stipulated that an independent body should manage the national DNA 
database.  He was adamant in his opposition to allowing insurance companies 
access to genetic information. Two years later Jeffreys was quoted as saying that 
it would be “criminally irresponsible” for the British Government not to maintain 
the DNA profile databases, commenting that it would allow rapists and murderers 
to be able to continue unstopped (Whiteman, 2004).  After Britain expanded its 
DNA collection practices to include all those arrested for a crime, whether 
convicted or not, the UK had the world’s largest DNA database, containing five 
percent of the population (Slack, 2006).  Some critics worried that the 
government might sell individuals’ DNA profiles to insurance companies or 
mortgage brokers.   
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An FBI Privacy Impact Assessment (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
2004) noted that the NDIS Custodian cannot personally identify DNA records by 
name or other personal identifiers.  Only federal, state and local crime labs 
performing DNA analysis can store and access the information.  The labs must 
maintain the records in a secure government facility with limited access and 
protected by physical and technological safeguards to prevent unauthorized 
access.  A U.S. Congressional bill signed into law on May 21, 2008 (H.R. 493, 
2008) prohibits employment or health insurance discrimination based on genetic 
information.  This means that insurance companies or employers are forbidden 
from misusing the genetic information of a person who submits to DNA testing.   
In its April 2008 proposed rule, the DOJ pointed out that the FBI’s method 
of creating the profiles, using 13 core loci, positively identifies the individual 
without disclosing his or her traits, disorders or dispositions.  It noted that the 
design and legal rules of CODIS allow for law enforcement identification but 
prevent the unauthorized use of DNA profiles (USDOJ, April 2008).  
An article discussing the recent government expansion of DNA testing 
(Sullivan, 2008) outlined the crime fighting benefits of the expanded DNA 
collection, as well as the privacy concerns.  The author said that privacy laws 
prohibit using DNA to identify genetic traits or disorders.  Following the article 
was a string of on-line conversations regarding the topic, both for and against the 
testing.  One writer pointed out that years ago there was a big debate about HIV 
testing, and that it has not had the dire consequences some had predicted.  
The above literature review indicates that many scholars advocate DNA 
collection for all in the interest of fairness and crime prevention.  Most, however, 
do not believe in preserving the samples taken from individuals.  In pursuing 
diffusion of DNA testing, USCIS must explore ways to persuade immigrants, their 
advocates and the public that it will not pose a threat to their privacy but instead 
might protect them from identity theft and other crimes.  USCIS must therefore 
ensure that, in developing any DNA policies or regulations, privacy and 
protection of the database is a priority. 
 22
F. TECHNOLOGY, COLLABORATION AND INTEROPERABILITY 
Governments and the public are utilizing DNA technology more and more 
frequently to fight crime and verify relationships.  The DNA Initiative Web site 
(n.d.) describes two systems that manage DNA profiles in the United States.  The 
Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), established and funded by the FBI, is 
the computer software program used to compare DNA profiles electronically.  It 
compares data collected from unsolved crime scenes to samples taken from 
criminals, and it compares DNA samples from unidentified victims to DNA data 
provided as a reference by relatives of missing persons.  The National DNA 
Index System (NDIS) is the database that stores the information that feeds into 
the CODIS system.  The FBI provides CODIS software to all public forensic 
laboratories at no cost.  If USCIS utilizes CODIS and NDIS to download and run 
DNA profiles, then this would enable an almost seamless information-sharing 
process using already established and trusted systems.  Such sharing would 
help federal, state, and local law enforcement officials solve more crimes, thus 
protecting the American public.  Utilizing NDIS and CODIS would help USCIS 
screen potential immigrants for crime and terrorism and verify identity and 
biological relationships to prevent fraud, human smuggling, and trafficking. 
At the 2009 Biometric Consortium Conference, Dr. Peter Vallone of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) spoke on the NIST rapid 
DNA testing project.  In his overview, Vallone noted that each person has unique 
DNA (except identical twins), that half a person’s DNA comes from the mother 
and half from the father and that DNA remains the same throughout a person’s 
life.  He stressed that forensic scientists are not looking at genes or information 
such as race, predisposition to disease, eye color, hair color, etc., when typing 
DNA; they are only using it to uniquely identify a person.  Vallone described one 
experimental rapid DNA project that used a 15 STR loci kit.  He said the random 
match probability (the chance of someone else having this exact same profile) 
was about one in 800 trillion.  He called the new technology a “lab on a chip.”  He 
said the NIST goal for rapid DNA testing technology is to shorten the processing 
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time to under an hour, make it portable and rugged, and require little expertise or 
experience.  “Swab in…answer out,” he noted. 
The Department of Homeland Security’s US-VISIT Program uses 
biometrics to facilitate legitimate travel; prevent admission of criminals, terrorists 
and immigration violators; and protect the privacy of visitors. US-VISIT collects, 
stores, and shares digital fingerprints and photographs of aliens seeking entry 
into the United States.  This program is a successful model for biometric 
information sharing, and is mutually beneficial to various DHS components, as 
well as to state and local partners and the U.S. departments of State, Defense 
and Justice, to name a few (U.S. Department of Homeland Security [USDHS], 
n.d. and Napolitano, 2009, May 6).  Although US-VISIT does not currently store 
DNA, they are working with other agencies on various options for a multimodality 
approach for biometric capture. 
INTERPOL’s DNA database, the “DNA Gateway,” was created in 2002 
with only one DNA profile.  By the end of 2008, it contained more than 82,000 
profiles from 48 member countries.  On its Web site, INTERPOL pointed out that 
it is only the conduit for the sharing and comparison of information and does not 
keep any nominal data linking a profile to an individual.  Instead, member 
countries retain ownership of the profile.  INTERPOL advocates international 
technical standards to support successful cross-border collaboration, and said 
the Gateway is compatible with the FBI’s CODIS software (INTERPOL, n.d.). 
Much has been written about diffusion of innovative technology, and the 
factors that play a role in adoption of such technology.  We might apply these 
theories to DNA technology.  In Diffusion of Innovation, Everett Rogers (2003) 
stressed the importance of “perceived attributes” in innovations, and identified 
those perceived attributes.  Relative Advantage is the degree to which an 
innovation is perceived as being better than its precursor.  Compatibility is the 
degree to which it is perceived as being consistent with the existing values, 
needs, and experiences of potential adopters.  Complexity is the degree to which 
an innovation is perceived as being difficult to use.  Observability is the degree to 
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which the results of an innovation are observable to others.  Finally, Trialability is 
the degree to which an innovation may be experimented with before adoption.   
USCIS should keep all of these factors in mind when exploring the feasibility of 
moving forward with diffusion of DNA testing in the immigration process.   
DNA technology is available and improving rapidly.  Multiple agencies 
including DHS, DoD, and NIST are working on rapid DNA technology.  What 
remains to be determined is how USCIS can work together with other agencies 
and tap in to established systems that are already proven and operational and 
already have strict privacy rules in force.  We need more information on how 
USCIS might seek agreements on mutually beneficial arrangements to share 
DNA data with state, local, federal and international partners.  Finally, USCIS 
must explore factors that might promote adoption of this innovative DNA 
technology. 
G. COMPREHENSIVE IMMIGRATION REFORM  
The United States Congress unsuccessfully attempted passage of a 
comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) bill two years ago.  Though President 
Bush, Democratic leaders and centrist Republicans supported it, the attempt to 
overhaul immigration failed in 2007 primarily because of disagreement over the 
issue of amnesty. During last year’s Presidential campaign, and since his 
election, President Obama has promised to pursue the immigration reform effort.  
However, health care and the economy have monopolized the agenda thus far 
and many believe that if Congress does not pass immigration reform before the 
summer of 2010, they will postpone it at least until after the November 2010 
elections.   
While many advocates favor some provision for a path to citizenship for 
the estimated twelve million people already in the United States, many others 
strongly oppose any sort of amnesty.  There is, however, still some hope for 
compromise.  Senator Lindsay Graham (R-SC) said he believes that we will see 
some give-and-take as soon as the American people are sure that the border is 
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secure.  Senator David Vitter (R-LA) commented that Congress remains divided 
on this issue, but added, “I think there’s still very much the same support among 
the American people for getting serious first with enforcement”  (Alarkon, 2009). 
Senator Charles Schumer (D-NY) is a member of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and is the Chairman of the subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees 
and Border Security.  As such, he has played a major role in trying to jumpstart 
the immigration reform issue.  A recent article on proposed Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform (CIR), noted that Schumer planned to introduce legislation 
that included a technology-driven project that would incorporate biometrics to 
verify identity (Strohm, 2009).  Although Senator Schumer did not specifically 
mention DNA in advocating for expanded use of biometrics, in 2008 he 
announced over $500,000 in grants for Long Island, New York to improve DNA 
efficiency and clear backlogs.  In his press release, Schumer said, “DNA 
technology is the cutting-edge of criminal science.”  He noted that it helped 
ensure swift and accurate justice and that it helps to identify the guilty and 
exonerate the innocent.   Although it is unclear how exactly he views DNA’s role 
in any future immigration reform, it is apparent that Senator Schumer supports 
the use of biometrics in immigration and supports the use of DNA in general. 
Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) is another member of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and of the Immigration, Refugees and Border Security 
Subcommittee, which Schumer chairs.  Senator Feinstein has worked well in the 
past with Republican Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona.  Joining Schumer and Feinstein 
on the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Immigration, Refugees and Border 
Security Subcommittee, Kyl also is the Ranking Member of the subcommittee for 
Terrorism and Homeland Security.  Feinstein and Kyl have coordinated in the 
past on issues of both immigration and DNA testing.  A 2004 press release 
describes a bill Senator Feinstein worked on with Senator Kyl that provided rights 
to victims.  The bill also provided access to DNA testing for death row and other 
prison inmates who claim innocence, and funds to help to eliminate the backlog 
in rape kits and other crime scene analysis (Feinstein, 2004). 
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Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano has also 
historically supported technology and DNA testing.  A December 2008 USA 
Today article noted that Napolitano is a big advocate of using advanced 
technology to support law enforcement.  As Governor of Arizona, she signed a 
bill making Arizona one of twelve states to collect and store DNA from people 
accused but not convicted of certain crimes (Frank, 2008).  The article indicated 
that Napolitano views DNA for suspects as “the modern equivalent of 
fingerprints.”  Although Arizona’s ACLU criticized Napolitano, one state 
representative assured that Napolitano “looks for a balance between protecting 
civil liberties and ensuring safety.” 
On February 25, 2009, Secretary Napolitano testified before the House 
Committee on Homeland Security.  She stressed the importance of improving 
intelligence sharing with state and local partners, saying that such sharing 
requires a seamless network.  She highlighted the necessity to protect the rights 
of Americans and to strengthen the system against identity fraud.  Napolitano 
said, “Better technology can expand our capabilities and free our agents to spend 
their time where it is most valuable,” noting that cutting edge technology will 
improve all DHS capabilities, including immigration programs.  Napolitano 
stressed that, when implementing new technology, DHS would be diligent in 
honoring the rights of Americans and addressing concerns raised about privacy.  
She said that DHS would include privacy in “everything we do.”  (Napolitano, 
2009)  
On June 8, 2009, DHS Secretary Napolitano issued a message in the 
Leadership Journal to outline the Department’s five major responsibilities.  
Specifically, they are to: 1) protect the American people from terrorist threats; 2) 
secure our borders; 3) facilitate legal immigration while cracking down on those 
who violate our laws; 4) improve readiness for, response to, and recovery from 




components working together to more effectively carry out their mission. 
Secretary Napolitano discussed expanding DHS’s capabilities through the 
deployment of science and technology.   
In July 2009, a bipartisan task force co-chaired by former Florida governor 
Jeb Bush (R) and former Clinton White House chief of staff Thomas V. McLarty 
III, issued their recommendations on immigration reform.   They supported a 
2006 recommendation by the Migration Policy Institute to establish future 
immigration levels based on economic conditions, strong border enforcement 
and mandatory work document verification using fingerprints or eye scans.  They 
also recommended the opportunity for “earned legalization, not amnesty” for the 
millions who are living in the United States illegally.  Requirements for such 
earned legalization would include paying taxes, learning English, passing 
background checks, paying fines and waiting in line behind legal immigrants 
(Hsu, 2009). 
The literature indicates that, although the main hurdle to CIR is the issue 
of amnesty, some compromise may be possible to allow a path to citizenship for 
at least some of the millions of people who currently live in the United States 
illegally.  Any such program would require very strict screening procedures to 
enable USCIS to clearly identify those seeking benefits and ensure that they are 
not a threat to the United States.  It makes sense that the bar might be higher for 
anyone seeking forgiveness for breaking the law than it would be for those who 
have played by the rules from the beginning.  Since none of the leaders driving 
immigration reform has spoken specifically about DNA in relation to CIR, the 
question of whether DNA might play a role, and whether it might enable or hinder 
compromise, remains to be answered. 
H. SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE 
The literature is not abundant in terms of linking DNA and immigration.  
However, it provides support for the idea that immigration fraud is a problem and 
that DNA can aid in verifying identity and biological relationships and in screening 
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for crimes and terrorism.  DNA testing, however, is a controversial issue, with 
proponents praising its detection and deterrent values and opponents citing the 
possibilities of misuse.   The literature has not specifically answered the question 
of how USCIS might integrate the use of DNA testing.  More research is needed 
regarding the benefits of DNA testing, information-sharing possibilities, privacy 
and security issues, and impact DNA testing may have on proposed immigration 
reform. 
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III. RESEARCH METHOD 
Very little research thus far specifically ties DNA testing to immigration.  In 
order to further the research, I employed various qualitative data collection 
methodologies, such as interviews, observations, and participation in, and 
observation of, a nationwide DHS-sponsored survey.  I conducted formal 
interviews with three subject matter experts in the fields of DNA technology, 
biometric technology in general, law, privacy, and public policy.  I visited Haiti, 
where I observed DNA testing and gathered information about the benefits and 
issues associated with DNA testing.  I took advantage of the National Dialogue 
on the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR) to obtain anonymous 
feedback on the idea of utilizing DNA technology for immigration purposes. The 
goal was to develop a policy recommendation regarding whether and how to 
move forward toward expanded DNA testing in the immigration process. 
A. INTERVIEWS 
I conducted three formal interviews of subject matter experts who could 
help address issues regarding the technical, legal and information-sharing 
aspects of DNA testing, as well as the privacy implications and policy 
considerations. I wanted to discuss the feasibility of expanding DNA testing, 
including how it might enhance future immigration reform.   
The first interview was with Joe Matal, General Counsel to Senator Jeff 
Sessions of Alabama, who is the Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.  The Senate Judiciary Committee handles issues concerning the 
Constitution, crime and justice, immigration, refugees, border security, terrorism 
and Homeland Security.  Any expansion of DNA testing in the immigration 
context would affect all of these.  I asked to interview Mr. Matal because he is a 
subject matter expert on DNA testing, especially as it relates to criminal 
databases.  He previously worked for Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, and assisted 
him in drafting key DNA legislation.  Senator Kyl was the legislative author of the 
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DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, which was eventually folded into the Violence 
Against Women and Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Public 
Law 109-162).  He also played a prominent role in passage of the Adam Walsh 
Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-248).  Mr. Matal 
assisted Senator Kyl in providing comments to the Department of Justice’s April 
18, 2008 proposed rule to expand the collection of DNA by federal officers.  The 
DOJ promulgated the proposed rule in part as a response to the Violence against 
Women and Adam Walsh acts (USDOJ, April 2008).  The rule, finalized in 
December 2008, mandates DNA testing for all arrestees as well as non-U.S. 
citizens who are detained and fingerprinted (USDOJ, December 2008).  
My second interview was with William Gravell, President of Diogenes 
Group. LLC. Mr. Gravell has long been an expert in identity management.   He 
spent most of his naval career on government activities related to the 
management and protection of information.  In 2007, the Navy appointed him as 
Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Navy for Identity Management.  Mr. 
Gravell was the principal drafter of the Identity Management Task Force Report, 
2008, published by the Executive Office of the President’s National Science and 
Technology Council, Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management.  He 
has authored or contributed to numerous other reports.  Mr. Gravell has also 
developed an Identity Management Master’s program at the Naval Postgraduate 
School in Monterey, California.  The program will soon be expanded to include 
an Identity Management Ph.D. program. I had the opportunity to hear Mr. Gravell 
speak at the 2009 Biometric Consortium Conference (BCC) and saw him as a 
“big-picture” thinker who carefully considered public views and reactions to 
identity management policies. 
Finally, I interviewed Dr. Myra Gray, who is Director of the Department of 
Defense’s Biometrics Task Force.  Dr. Gray has held a variety of increasingly 
responsible DoD positions over the years.  She holds a Master of Science 
degree in National Resource Strategy from the Industrial College of the Armed 
Forces, a Doctorate of Science degree in Research and Engineering 
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Management from the Southeastern Institute of Technology, a Master of Arts 
degree in Business Management from the Central Michigan University, and a 
Bachelor of Science in Mathematics from Athens State College. Dr. Gray also 
spoke at the BCC, and I was particularly anxious to discuss with her the DoD’s 
rapidly expanding DNA database and the DoD perspective on how and under 
what circumstances they might share the information.  
B. HAITI 
In May 2009, I had the opportunity to visit the American Embassy in Port 
au Prince, Haiti.  Haiti is a country where records are often unavailable.  Since 
the U.S. government would likely deny many petitions and visa applications 
without sufficient documents, many people resort to DNA testing. In Port au 
Prince, I observed the DNA collection process and learned more about how 
others perceive DNA testing and how USCIS might improve and expand DNA as 
a tool.  
The observations in Haiti helped to answer research questions on the 
financial incentives and other benefits of DNA testing up-front in the immigration 
process.  Such up-front testing would help USCIS, the Department of State, the 
applicants and petitioners who are seeking benefits, and U.S. taxpayers.   The 
research in Haiti also shed light on changes to DNA policies and regulations that 
USCIS may want to make to help ensure integrity and improve the process.   
C. NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON THE QHSR 
This year, the Department of Homeland Security conducted the nation’s 
first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR). In order to include 
stakeholders in the process, DHS conducted an innovative outreach effort, called 
the National Dialogue on the QHSR.  The dialogue was a series of three different 
online interactive conversations, each of which covered a period of days, on 
various homeland security issues.  From July 16 to October 4, more than 20,000 
people participated in this online dialogue to help inform the development of the 
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QHSR (USDHS, 2009).  I took advantage of this exercise to present the idea of 
DNA testing to the public and to receive public reaction to such a proposal.   
Participation in the QHSR National Dialogue highlighted misunderstanding 
and fear that some people may have about DNA testing.  It provided insight into 
issues, such as privacy and cost, which USCIS must address in any DNA 
expansion proposals and in any public outreach to promote and gain acceptance 
of such expansion. 
D. THEORETICAL LENS 
Strauss and Corbin refer to theoretical sensitivity as “a personal quality of 
the researcher.” They note that researchers come into a research environment 
with various levels of sensitivity that are determined by personal and professional 
experiences.  Such experience allows researchers to develop theories that are 
“grounded, conceptually dense, and well integrated” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990).    
Although I sought to approach my research without bias, my personal and 
professional experiences may have influenced not only the research but also my 
interpretation of the findings.  In order to maintain transparency, outlined below is 
a summary of experiences that may have influenced this research.  
Early in my government career, I worked in the Consular Section at the 
American Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia.  There I conducted daily visa interviews, 
although my primary responsibility was American Citizen Services.  That was my 
first exposure to fraud for immigration and citizenship purposes, and it opened 
my eyes to the lengths to which people would go to gain residency in the United 
States.  I often encountered people claiming U.S. citizenship based on 
parentage.  They attempted to obtain U.S. passports, but rarely succeeded in 
establishing eligibility.  One Liberian-American woman, who appeared to be in 
her mid-forties, requested a U.S. passport for a newborn infant.   I questioned 
why, when Americans living in Liberia travel to America to give birth, she would 
travel from America to give birth in Liberia.  I requested the now-obsolete blood 
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tests, and never saw the woman again (this was before Sir Alec Jeffries had 
developed the ability to prove relationships through DNA testing).  I believed that 
the woman was attempting to smuggle someone else’s child to the United States. 
In 2003 and 2004, while working with USCIS in Portland, Oregon, I 
assisted local authorities in bringing to justice Deniz Aydiner, the murderer of a 
University of Portland student.  This high-profile crime was committed in May 
2001, but police were not able to identify Aydiner until 2003; they were finally 
able to arrest him in January 2004.  He was a Turkish national who had married 
a U.S. citizen.  It was then that I realized the shortcomings in the current 
immigrant screening process.  Our fingerprint and name checks would never 
have revealed that Aydiner was a murderer.  He cleaned up his fingerprints at the 
crime scene and, though he attempted to clean up his DNA, it was hard not to 
leave it behind.  If his DNA had been on file, the police could have identified him 
within hours or days of the murder.  The family could have been spared the 
agony of nearly three years of not knowing, the community could have been 
reassured that the perpetrator was no longer at large, and the police would have 
saved more than two years of investigative resources.   
Later, from 2006 until 2008, I traveled the world as a Supervisory Refugee 
Officer, leading teams of officers to interview applicants seeking refugee status in 
the United States.  Although there were many very compelling cases, and I am 
proud that the United States has a strong humanitarian program, I was alarmed 
at the very apparent fraud.  I realized that many people were taking advantage of 
the U.S. government’s generosity and of its inability to verify people’s identities or 
the veracity of the claimed relationships that were often the basis for refugee 
access.  Some people were taking bribes of tens of thousands of dollars to 
include an impostor on their family tree.  Some people forced others to include 
impostors in their claimed family group and threatened them with harm if they 
refused.  I also was alarmed at the potential abuse and exploitation of children 
because of that same lack of ability to verify identities and relationships.  After 
the 2008 pilot DNA testing that revealed extremely high fraud rates (not a 
 34
surprise to me), I witnessed the harm that this revelation created.  The legitimate 
refugees and bona fide family members of refugees and asylees in the United 
States who wished to reunite with their family members suffered because of the 
fraud on the part of many.  They faced an increased burden of proof to verify 
biological relationships.  Unfortunately, the costs of DNA testing are high when 
conducted on an individual basis, and the refugees and asylees are some of the 
poorest and least able to pay.  I saw a valid need and benefit in USCIS 
expansion and streamlining of DNA testing. 
From mid-2008 until just recently, I was Chief of the Policy and Regulation 
Management Division for Domestic Operations at the USCIS headquarters in 
Washington, D.C.  In that position I pursued changes in DNA testing policies and 
regulations, and realized the many challenges that USCIS must overcome in 
order to implement such sweeping changes.    
These personal experiences propelled me to pursue this thesis topic of 
DNA testing in the immigration process.  They provided the will and the passion 
to seek a solution that will improve customer service, facilitate interagency 
coordination and protect against fraud, human trafficking, crime and terrorism. 
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IV. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
A. INTERVIEWS 
1. Matal 
Joe Matal is General Counsel to Senator Jeff Sessions of Alabama, who is 
the Ranking Member of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Mr. Matal previously 
worked for Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona and assisted him in his work on expanded 
DNA testing for federal arrestees.   I interviewed Matal in Washington, D.C., on 
October 8, 2009, and asked him about progress on implementation of the DOJ 
rule that supported the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005 and the Adam Walsh 
legislation.  He assured me that the government is implementing the rule but said 
that the testing of the non-U.S. citizens was slower to begin because of 
operational issues.   
Matal acknowledged he had never really focused on DNA’s use and 
effectiveness in the immigration benefit process, although he was quite involved 
in work on the expanded DNA testing of arrestees and detained non-U.S. 
citizens.  He pointed out that the amendment focuses on taking DNA from people 
in detention because they are here illegally.  The amendment focused on solving 
crime; it did not focus on immigration benefits fraud issues.   
When asked if he was aware of similar uses of DNA for other types of 
federal government programs, Matal said he believed that the military has been 
aggressive in taking DNA from people captured in relation to the war with Al-
Qaeda. He said he has mainly focused on the law-enforcement issues, and those 
mostly involve the states.  Matal stated that though the federal DNA collection is 
important, the main volume of criminal cases comes from the states, and that the 
most important thing “we can do” is to create a platform and a standard for the 
states to use and allow them to use the National DNA Index System (NDIS) to 
compare information.  He said that one of the things the 2005 Kyl amendment did 
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was to allow states to upload arrestee samples to NDIS.  Before that 
amendment, states could only upload samples of those people already convicted 
of felonies.  Matal believes that NDIS is the only practicable mechanism for 
comparing DNA from people sampled in one state to crime scenes in another 
state.  He said if the states cannot use NDIS then they would have to go to all the 
other 49 states to test something.  As a practical matter, the inability to share 
through NDIS would impede crime solving. Matal said that as soon as they 
implemented the new law the government immediately started getting cross-state 
hits on arrestee samples.  This ability to share is important, he said, because 
criminals travel.  They commit crimes in one state; no one solves the crimes, and 
then the criminals move on to another state.   
I asked Matal if he believes it would be feasible to utilize DNA technology 
to establish identity, protect against immigration fraud and human smuggling, and 
enhance security checks to protect the public.  He said he believed it would be 
useful for all those things, and pointed to the fact that at times it is impossible to 
establish people’s identities.  Matal noted that through DNA and other biometric 
screening our government had discovered that many people involved with Al-
Qaeda in Iraq were previously arrested in the United States.   
When asked what he believes are the major legal and privacy issues to 
consider in any expansion of DNA testing in the immigration process, Matal said 
there would be an inevitable Fourth Amendment challenge.  Although some 
people make the argument that DNA testing violates the Fourth Amendment, 
Matal said he believes it clearly does not, for the reasons laid out in the Kyl letter 
(Kyl, 2008).  He commented, 
Once you see how this program really works and what information 
really is accessible, which is really nothing, and then you look at the 
miniscule possibility that a lab employee would actually reconfigure 
his equipment and risk losing his job, or jail time, it’s ridiculous.  It is 
never going to happen.  Frankly, it is not that hard to get people’s 
DNA from other means.  You just pick up a coffee cup they threw in 
the garbage and send it to any private lab and have them test it for 
whatever.  The privacy risks posed by the federal database are 
miniscule.  
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Although he believes the Fourth Amendment arguments are borderline 
frivolous, Matal believes they will be made.  He said the issue might end up in the 
Supreme Court at some point.  Matal said that 21 different states and the federal 
government currently take DNA samples from arrestees.  He pointed out that 
there has never been a significant privacy violation related to convict sampling, 
which has been going on much longer.  Matal stressed that the government has 
solved many horrible, violent crimes and probably prevented many others as a 
result.  He did not believe that a court would look at this and throw it all out. 
Noting, “I just don’t see that happening.  No one who looks at the facts and 
what’s actually gone on could possibly conclude that this is an unreasonable 
intrusion on your privacy.” 
Matal believes it is reasonable to require DNA testing as a condition of 
applying for immigration benefits, just as fingerprints are already a requirement.  
He thinks it makes sense, especially if the person has already been in the U.S. 
for a while.  He said, “You definitely want to see if the person has committed a 
crime before giving that person any kind of permanent immigration status.”   
Matal also pointed out DNA’s value in verifying familial relationships as the 
basis for claiming an immigration benefit.  He thought it likely that in the future 
the government may bounce DNA against other countries’ databases to see if 
the applicant committed a crime anywhere else. 
When asked about the feasibility of sharing DNA databases with the 
Department of Defense and INTERPOL, Matal said he had heard of issues of 
interoperability and that the Europeans are using a different standard than we 
are.  He thought the lack of standardization would be unfortunate.  He said he 
heard the DoD was using DNA to track people’s movements and establish links 
between terrorists through DNA left at the scene of a firefight and that left at 
other locations. 
Matal thought the costs of integrating DNA testing into the immigration 
benefit process would likely be trivial.  He said sampling does not cost that much, 
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the benefits are huge, and you save money rapidly over time.  He acknowledged 
he does not know very much about the use of DNA in the broad immigration 
context.  However, in the crime context, he said, just the investigation and 
prosecution of the violent crimes is enormously expensive, not to mention the 
human costs of the crime itself.  DNA testing can help to prevent a rape or a 
murder from happening and avoid the enormous costs of investigating and 
prosecuting such cases.  Matal said the Los Angeles police chief estimated that it 
costs them about a million dollars to prosecute a murder case. 
The potential negative implications of implementing expanded DNA testing 
seemed negligible to Matal.  He said he has heard every conceivable argument 
against DNA testing from the ACLU and similar groups, but that there is no 
substantial argument against it.  He said the cost is trivial compared to the pay-
off from using this technology.  He stressed the fact that the profile created for 
the database for purposes of identification does not reveal anything medically 
sensitive.  He said even if it did, it is very tightly regulated and controlled.  Matal 
pointed out how easy it is for practically anyone to get someone’s saliva if he or 
she really wants to, just by following that person and taking his discarded coffee 
cup or water bottle from the trash.  He said it is not as if the government is getting 
some super secret material or a person’s medical or FBI file, or usually 
inaccessible information.  The FBI stores DNA in a controlled database, with 
professionals who would not jeopardize their careers or risk criminal sanctions. 
I asked Mr. Matal if he thought DNA testing might play a role in any future 
Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR), or if he believed the inclusion of 
expanded DNA testing would make CIR, with some path for permanent 
residence, more acceptable to those who currently oppose it.  He said it is not 
merely a process issue for those who object to the substance of amnesty in 
general.  He did say it made sense to use DNA, but he knew that many of the 
immigration groups are very resistant to any effective fraud prevention 
mechanism.   
 39
Matal did not see much difference between those people who might apply 
for any future amnesty and those non-U.S. citizens in detention for whom DNA 
collection is now authorized.  He pointed out that DNA testing is a minimal 
privacy intrusion for a legitimate purpose.  He said if used for immigration 
screening it would have the added benefit of verifying familial relationships.   
I asked Matal how he would compare the value of fingerprint checks to the 
value of DNA profiles.  He said DNA is much more valuable because there is a 
higher likelihood that a criminal would leave it behind at a crime scene.  Often a 
criminal wears gloves, or a useable print is not obtainable.  However, in many 
crimes, it is hard to avoid leaving DNA behind, because murderers might cut 
themselves, and rapists might leave DNA.  Experts increasingly are able to get 
DNA from smaller and smaller samples.  In that sense, Matal says, it is much 
more powerful.  Although fingerprints are pretty exact, and they have never found 
two fingerprints that are the same, Matal says, DNA is faster, easier, and even 
more sure.   He noted that you are much more likely to be able to get DNA than a 
regular fingerprint. 
I asked Mr. Matal how he felt about the ability of DHS, working with the 
FBI, to maintain the strict privacy standards and record of integrity that the FBI 
has maintained with their DNA database over the past 20 years.  He pointed out 
that in the more than twenty years that the FBI lab has been conducting DNA 
analysis there has never been a case in which a lab employee made an 
unauthorized disclosure of DNA information.  He said, “This isn’t some new 
program where we have to speculate as to whether it’s going to result in privacy 
violations.  It has a very substantial track record.” 
Matal said he did not know enough about the USCIS authorizing statutes 
to speculate about whether or not they could accomplish expansion of DNA 
testing in the immigration benefit process through regulation, or whether it would 
require legislation.  He said it seemed like we should be able to accomplish this 
through regulation. 
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Mr. Matal referred me to Senator Kyl’s May 19, 2008 letter providing 
comments to the DOJ proposed rule on DNA collection.  In that letter, Senator 
Kyl provided very detailed arguments on the privacy issue.  Matal also provided 
me with copies of two studies, one by the city of Chicago, and another one by the 
state of Maryland, documenting the effectiveness of arrestee sampling.  Finally, 
he provided me with a copy of Senator Kyl’s speech, from the Congressional 
Record of the Senate, dated December 16, 2005, on the DNA Fingerprint Act of 
2005.  . 
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS—Interview with Joe Matal 
What factors might promote the diffusion of innovative DNA 
technology to help USCIS establish identity, protect against immigration 
fraud and human trafficking, and enhance security checks that will protect 
the public against criminals and terrorists?   Matal believes there are good 
arguments for using DNA to screen for crime and terrorism and to verify family 
relationships.   He does not see any substantial argument against it.   What are 
the financial incentives and the benefits of up-front DNA testing to USCIS 
stakeholders?  Matal sees valid uses for DNA testing in the immigration 
process.  He noted that DNA and other biometric screening had helped our 
government discover people involved with Al-Qaeda in Iraq who were previously 
arrested in the United States.  He believes the costs of integrating DNA testing 
into the immigration benefit process would likely be trivial.  He noted that 
sampling does not cost very much, the benefits are huge, and the American 
public actually saves money rapidly over time in crime prevention alone.  What 
are the legal and privacy issues that USCIS must consider, and what policy, 
regulatory or legislative changes are needed? Matal said there will be an 
inevitable Fourth Amendment challenge and it may end up in the Supreme Court 
at some point.  However, he insists the privacy risks posed by the federal 
database are miniscule, noting there have never been any significant privacy 
violations tied to convict sampling.  He said DNA testing results in minimal 
privacy intrusion for a legitimate purpose and the current programs have a very 
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substantial record of success in protecting privacy.  He said he was not sure, but 
believes USCIS should be able to accomplish these changes through regulation.  
How can interagency collaboration play a role in this effort and benefit from 
it? Matal pointed out the importance of creating a platform and a standard for the 
states to use and allowing them to use the National DNA Index System (NDIS) to 
compare information. He said NDIS has allowed the local and state agencies to 
solve multi-state crimes they never would have been able to solve otherwise.  In 
regards to collaboration with Defense and INTERPOL, Matal said he had heard 
there are issues of interoperability and he was worried that the Europeans are 
using a different standard than we are.  What role might DNA testing play in 
any future comprehensive immigration reform?  Matal did not seem to 
believe those who oppose amnesty would like it any better if DNA were a factor.  
He thought the DNA testing makes sense, but noted some of the immigrant 
groups are against any type of enforcement.   
2. Gravell 
William Gravell is President of Diogenes Group, LLC, and is a retired 
naval officer with years of experience in information management and protection.  
He was formerly Special Advisor to the Secretary of the Navy for Identity 
Management.  I interviewed Mr. Gravell in Arlington, Virginia, on October 14, 
2009.   
I explained that I was investigating the feasibility of expanding the use of 
DNA testing in the U.S. immigration process and examining three possible uses 
for DNA testing.  The proposed expansion would make DNA testing a condition 
of applying for an immigration benefit.  The DNA would help USCIS to create a 
person-centric identifier, prove qualifying biological relationships, and enhance 
security screening.  I told Gravell that submission of fingerprints for security 
checks is already a condition of applying for many immigration benefits, and 
asked if he believed that submission of DNA would be different.   
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He pointed out that DNA has a legal character that differentiates it from 
other forms of biometrics.  He said that in addition to permitting identification, 
DNA has the potential to illuminate otherwise hidden aspects of congenital health 
issues, ancestry, and racial composition, which is socially sensitive in various 
ways.  He said we should rigorously examine and resolve those concerns before 
moving forward to be sure that expanded DNA testing is an acceptable action in 
policy.   
I said the FBI’S standard 13 core loci do not identify any health aspects or 
racial aspects.  Gravell stressed that public perceptions are all powerful in 
identity management, and said government has failed to recognize the social 
sensitivity of identifiability. For example, he said fingerprints are stigmatized by 
their association with the law enforcement process.  This is in spite of the fact 
they have been used for other purposes for literally a century and are inherently 
benign.  The difference, Gravell said, is not technological; it is found in 
messaging.  He noted if you do not first consider social acceptance, you will 
waste all the technological effort and the effort will fail.   
Gravell used the analogy of Bert the Turtle, a reference to a government 
ad campaign of the 1950s related to civil defense.  He said the government 
understood at some wise level the need to assuage public concern and anxiety, 
to dispel ignorance and to replace it with informed, fact-based understanding.  
According to Gravell, “fact and understanding, delivered credibly, and before the 
need, will create much more value than hoping against hope that the subject 
never comes up and then having to try and clean up the breakage afterwards.”   
Gravell said we should recognize the social sensitivity; recognize that in 
the mind of the people, DNA is unique.  He said the federal government has a 
poor record of credibility in its messaging on identity management.  He referred 
me to a report he wrote last year, the Identity Management Task Force Report, 
2008, published by the Executive Office of the President’s National Science and 
Technology Council (NSTC), Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity 
Management.  The report makes the point that there are in fact two gross tracks 
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of identity management within the government:  Screening and Efficiency. 
Gravell said security is an objective we can achieve by the broadest possible 
screening.  If we make one particular transaction with a specific end-using 
application as efficient and secure as possible, whether it is buying a book on 
Amazon or filing your income taxes electronically, we can achieve efficiency, he 
said.   
Gravell again stressed the importance of messaging.  He said it is 
essential to do something the United States government has almost never done 
well, which is to recognize the importance of public messaging at the outset of 
major socially impactive public projects.   
Gravell said you would never have a condition where everybody 
everywhere is satisfied or mollified.  He said, “There will be people marching in 
Lafayette Square about biometrics that are going to be given to Martians.”  
However, he said, once the lawyers, Congress, and most of the populace are 
satisfied, if you have done a reasonably good job about making the case and 
showing the benefit and value, then you will get two good things.   
The first, he said, is the prospective sponsors.  “The people who have to 
spend the money to run the programs will see what’s in it for them and will see 
the benefits as expressed in the form of cash.”  Gravell cited the Health Care 
debate, saying that one of the reasons that the health care industry is on board 
this time rather than fifteen years ago is because, wisely, this time the 
administration has embraced the health care community. The government has 
pointed out how many more prospective clients the industry might have if they 
support the reform.  This strategy has seemed to temper the opposition. 
The second community that has to see the value in it for them, says 
Gravell, is the American public.  That, he says, means being able to do things 
you could not do before, and being able to do them exceedingly simply, without 
having to remember things.  The process should have built-in safeguards and be 
completely transparent.  The American public knows that when they are buying a 
 44
book on Amazon, and their little padlock at the top of the screen closes, the good 
thing has happened and now they are safe.  Now they can confidently give their 
credit card number because, although they do not have any idea how the system 
works, they know that it makes them secure, and they did not have to do a single 
thing.  Amazon arranged all that for them.  That is the model for success in 
identity management.   
Gravell expressed support for expansion of DNA testing to establish 
identity, verify family relationships and enhance security screening.  He noted 
there appears to be ample support for all of those uses.  However, he warned, 
“Do not be seduced by the obvious benefit to government, which is visible before 
the fact, and to embark on that understanding alone.  Recognize that to do that is 
to fail because you have not made the case. “  
When asked about the major legal and privacy issues the government 
must consider in any expansion of DNA testing in the immigration process, 
Gravell referred me again to the NSTC report (2008).   He said Pete Nast, who is 
a superb privacy lawyer and technologist and the DHS Chief Privacy and 
Technology Officer, wrote the privacy section of the NSTC report and that it’s 
been well regarded by the privacy community.  Gravell pointed out there is a 
minimal body of statute in case law in privacy, and that the Congressional 
underpinning of privacy is educed, not explicit.  He said there is more explicit 
right to ownership of a firearm than there is for privacy in this country.  Therefore, 
he said, the general understanding of privacy and practice must be tested 
situationally as new technologies appear to challenge it.   
He used the analogy of telephony, saying that in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries there was an understanding that the central operator was involved 
in every correspondence and could listen in to every word spoken on the line.  
There was no expectation of privacy.  Gravell said that it was only when 
technology improved, in the 1930s, to create a technological capability to call 
with no intermediary involved, that the legal doctrine of expectation of privacy 
emerged.  It was tested in court and, and as a result, Title III, the Wiretap Statute, 
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was enacted.  The statute protects against warrantless wiretaps.  Government 
may confiscate the protection against such wiretaps only under prescribed 
conditions in the statute.   
The insight from this example, according to Gravell, is that technology 
leads policy.  This means the privacy advocates will attune to the technological 
development and seek to understand its implications.  Policies that do not exist 
today regarding this program and every other program will have to be created, he 
said.  The laws and policies will codify the practice as it rolls out.  Gravell advised 
that if we have conditioned the operating environment in the ways he mentioned, 
then we “may lead people wisely to the right answer and not emotionally to a 
spasmodic and suspicious answer.” 
I asked Mr. Gravell what he believes are the main issues surrounding the 
use of DNA testing to screen potential immigrants against the DoD, INTERPOL 
and FBI databases.  He pointed out the legal framework regarding identifiability 
in the law enforcement context is much more straightforward and much better 
codified, because people are put to death on the basis of forensic data collected 
from scenes of crimes.  He noted, however, that he understood I was not talking 
about people who are presumed before the fact to be criminals, and that it is only 
in the course of the screening that we may discover fugitives from justice.  Every 
nation has its own code of law, its own concepts of governance, Gravell said, but 
he believes there is a global movement toward technological standardization of 
data.  This standardization, he said, is driven by an understanding that there is a 
value and a need to share data nationally within local constraints, laws and 
governance processes, for a variety of purposes. 
Gravell talked about the voluntary aspect of the proposal to expand DNA 
testing for potential immigrants.  He pointed out the fact that if you want to buy a 
fully automatic weapon in the State of Virginia, you must be fingerprinted, go 
through a background check, and register the weapon.  That is the law, those are 
the terms, and people understand that is what they have to go through.  He said 
because there is a greater degree of social risk associated with possession of 
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this capability, society is entitled to make higher-level demands.  This, he says, 
falls within the category of social identifiability.  He raised the issue of security 
investigations for clearances such as those that most federal employees have.  
He described the requirement to fill out forms and give out personal information, 
sometimes even submitting to extremely penetrating and embarrassing 
polygraph examinations.  However, he said, “That’s part of the deal.  You don’t 
have to have the polygraph, but if you want to have this job with a security 
clearance, you have to voluntarily submit to it.  Well, we’re OK with that; that’s 
part of the deal.”   
Gravell stressed that he is not a lawyer, but said he assumes the same 
general principle would apply to potential immigrants.  If people step forward 
voluntarily and seek something from the government, then the government is 
entitled to make certain demands.  Those demands may include biometric 
capture.  The privilege sought, whether it is a hunting or driving license, owning a 
machine gun, residence in the United States, a security clearance, or anything in 
between, may require identifiability.  If the benefit-seeker refuses to undergo 
those demands, the consequence is that he does not receive the privilege.   
Mr. Gravell raised the subject of the U.S. military fingerprinting people in 
Iraq.  He pointed out that the terrorist watch lists are relatively small because we 
really do not encounter terrorists very often.  Gravell said we know some people 
are good people, such as American military personnel, American government 
personnel, allied personnel, local police, local government, Red Cross workers, 
contractors, etc., and they are in the good person database.  What is in the 
middle, he said, is the gray area.  They are not convicts; they have not been 
accused of anything, but they are not on the known bad and not on the known 
good lists.  They are in the “I don’t know” list.  Perhaps that is how one thinks 
about immigrants, he said.  Gravell suggested that in dealing with the immigrant 
population, we must start with social judgment supported by a policy, and the 
technology regime will implement that will, once it is understood.   
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I asked Mr. Gravell how he viewed the ability of local, state, federal and 
international partners to achieve interoperability in this area.  Interoperability 
begins with standards, he stressed.  Without standards, Gravell said, there is no 
interoperability, no connectivity; you cannot skirt around that step.  It is folly to 
build an architecture here and here and here, three different places, and then 
after the fact say, “Why don’t we just now connect this?”  It is hideously 
expensive, if possible at all, and it is enormously complicated, he warned.   
At the same time, Gravell said, it is very difficult to attempt to create a 
single, global information-sharing architecture for identity management at the 
outset that embraces disparate policy regimes and different paying sponsors, 
with different goals.  There would be issues of who would pay, and what would 
be the return, and on what time line.  Gravell recommended everyone agree to 
codify a DNA sample in the same way.  He cautioned, however, that standards 
are not always connected to technology.  He gave as an example the fact that 
when the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)-201 was promulgated 
as a very fine technology standard; the industrial base was incapable of 
manufacturing to that standard.  In 2004, the President declared a very 
aggressive timeline for creation of a standard.  Very shortly thereafter, every 
federal department should manufacture and issue cards to that standard.  It 
turned out that was impossible, because the manufacturing base, which 
consisted then of three companies, could not manufacture cards to that standard 
on the mandated timeline.   
I told Mr. Gravell I had just received my HSPD-12 card.  He said the 
document signed by President Bush in August of 2004 commanded that the 
federal government issue the HSPD-12 cards to all federal employees within a 
short period of time.  That was five years ago, and apparently, they are just now 
getting around to it.  The problem, Gravell said, was no one had budgeted for it; 
they could not build it; and the documents were not available.  This illustrates the 
basic point that when creating standards one should take care to ensure that the 
technology and implementation are achievable.    
 48
Gravell warned that if we bring standards into place after preexisting 
technology regimes exist and the advocates later wish to connect them they will 
face difficulty.  Each one of them will probably build something different, and wish 
to impose that standard upon the collective.  He said it is intuitive that the other 
person is not going to want to give in.  Instead, he is going to want to impose his 
standard.  The solution, according to Gravell, is to do the standards first.   
I asked Mr. Gravell what he saw as the potential negative implications of 
implementing DNA testing in the immigration process.  His response was social 
backlash, sensitivity, ignorance-based opposition, and personal interest-based 
opposition from those who want to do things their way.  He reminded me that 
identity management and cyber security are comingled to the extent that there is 
some space of intersection.  The problem, he said, is the space has not been 
mapped, so equities, activities, programs, resources, and policy authorities are in 
the intersecting space.  Since they are unresolved, they pose one of three 
problems.  They will be fought over and pulled apart.  They will be pushed to 
someone else, because no one wants to be stuck to them or associated with 
them or have to pay for them or endure the stigma related to them.  In that case, 
nobody will do it, even though it needs doing.  Third, and most insidiously, they 
will both be appreciated and valued but in different ways, which is the case we 
are describing here.  Gravell said that some person powerful enough to 
command an answer could resolve the first two problems.  The third case, 
though, is much more difficult, because the stakeholders have a real investment -
- not just financial, but in reputation, in organizational pride and in stature and 
momentum.  They really want to do this, but they do not want their program they 
so painstakingly created to lose ground, and be stalled, and redirected, so they 
fight and fight and fight.   Gravell pointed out that this is very difficult to resolve.   
Standards, he said, must come first whenever possible.  He cautioned that 
it would not be possible in every case.  For instance, the FBI already has their 
standards. For a hundred years, their relationship to underlying police 
organizations has been, “I have decided how to do this.  If you want your stuff in 
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my database you have to provide it in this format.”  He said that the FBI has 
successfully imposed its standards on underlying law enforcement because they 
are dealing with much smaller organizations in every case.  Now, the FBI has 
stepped up to a billion-dollar, ten-year program with huge functionality.  Gravell 
said he was a supporting contractor to the FBI in creating the definition of what 
the functions of that facility would be.  He said he successfully made the 
argument that they should expand into things like training, collaborative graduate 
program development, collaborative research and development, virtual 
laboratories, and other efforts that would add functionality.  He told them, “If you 
create this space, don’t necessarily make it a data repository; make it a genuine 
collaborative work space, to expand the set of deliverables, to expand the 
perceived value by the underlying client.”  That is true to Gravell’s basic premise, 
that successful implementation starts with value as seen by the end user.   
Gravell identified another failing of government in identity management.  
He said that government is accustomed to being a technology or process or 
service provider.  Government is accustomed to seeing society as people who 
largely take what we give them the way that we give it to them.  The people we 
interact with are largely vendors who desperately want government contracts.  
He said there is a sycophancy that surrounds the government-not-
government relationship, centered on the ability of government to distribute 
wealth in the form of programs and contracts that the vendors will provide for.  
That, he said is not the way business does business.  You do not go into an auto 
dealership and hear, “You must buy this car because this is the car I built 
because I’ve decided this is what you should buy.” 
Gravel mused, “We now know how that turns out eventually, don’t we?”  
He pointed out that Americans decided at a point in the past that they were not 
impressed with big fins and a lot of sheet metal and a V8, 9,000-horsepower 
engine.  They wanted Hondas, or Volkswagens, something much more 
economical, much more reliable, much smaller, to fit in their parking lots 
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Therefore, he said, the consumer ends up controlling the auto industry. 
The consumer defines the requirements and declares what the nature of the 
product must be, or they simply decline to buy.  The service provider, Detroit, 
does not listen, and keeps producing cars that they feel are more attractive 
because they are more profitable, because, they know how to build big engines, 
and so on.  Eventually it all collapses.  Well, this is the basic model in business.   
In Gravell’s opinion, identity management will be valued when end users 
see the value.  First, the vendor will see the profit in providing the identity-
enabled service.  Gravell points out that Amazon sells more books because 
people are willing to give their credit cards to Amazon but are not willing to give it 
to somebody over the phone, for example.  He said he has refused to give his 
credit card at stores from time to time, where if for one reason or another he just 
did not like the setup, did not like the place—overseas, that kind of thing.  If he’s 
in Bangladesh, for example, he won’t give his credit card to a vendor in the souk, 
but he’ll walk back to his hotel, log on to the Internet, and give that same credit 
card number to Amazon without hesitation.  Two things occurred, he said; the 
vendor invested in the capability and the consumer saw the benefit.   
Gravell said the government is now attempting to create an identity 
management strategy.  However, he fears there is a risk that it will be a vast 
government bureaucracy, probably created by GSA, which may look a lot like 
their E-Gov model, which has not been widely adopted.  He says they will believe 
this model of identity management will sweep the nation.  “It will not.  Full stop.  It 
will fail.  You heard it first here.” 
Gravell referred me to the NSTAC report that he recently authored (The 
President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee [NSTAC], 
2009) and noted that what government can and should do is to recognize the 
limitations in its ability to message.  He suggested the government engage 
professional messagers, who know how to sell everything from soap powder to 
condos in Florida, and hire them to create a strategic messaging campaign that 
comes all the way back to Bert the Turtle.  Simple messages, Gravell said, 
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targeted at people who need to have simple, repeated messages imprinted upon 
them.  He does not believe that the government will come up with that on its own, 
but that Madison Avenue could come up with such a plan.   
Gravell said one thing the government can do that has value is to sponsor 
standards activities.  The United States of America sits at a table in the standards 
domain, he said.  He explained that the “United States” is some mix of the 
government with technical advice from academia, industry and others.  Gravell 
said that right now the ITU-T (the International Telecommunication Union’s 
Telecommunication Standardization Sector) is engaged in a yearlong effort 
toward identity management standards.  He said that the Chinese delegation to 
those talks is 200 people, every time they meet, while the American delegation is 
about five.  The risk, he pointed out, is that in a bureaucratic negotiation, the side 
with more heads can drown the side with fewer heads with process—with paper 
that has to be read, that has to be commented upon, or that has to be edited.  
Therefore, he said, the effort requires initiative. 
Gravell said that another thing the government can do is invest in research 
and development.  The reason that DARPA (Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency) is so successful, he said, is that DARPA is in the business of 
doing things that they do not necessarily know are going to work on the outset.  
The whole investment may be lost, but that is okay for DARPA because that is 
what DARPA does.  In addition, they do not necessarily ever pay a return, 
because DARPA does that too.  Sometimes, Gravell pointed out, they come up 
with something called the Internet, or other fantastic, amazing things.  Therefore, 
the business model for government investment in R&D is not linked to profit.  
Gravell said that he was in industry for seven years and that commercial R&D is 
always linked to profit.  He said in such a setting you do not get a dollar until you 
can, at the outset, declare the size of the market you are going to capture with 
this widget once it is created, several years from now.  He said if you cannot 
make that case, develop, and deliver on it, you would never get any more dollars.  
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Therefore, according to Gravell, there is a real downside, a real limitation to 
commercial R&D, which government can overcome. 
The third thing the government can do, Gravell said, is advocate.  He said   
we are currently blessed with one of the most gifted communicators in a century, 
alongside Ronald Reagan, and his ability to project charisma and influence an 
audience.  “We have the messager,” says Gravell, “but he does not have this 
message.”  Gravell believes we must create the message, hand it to the 
messenger, use the medium that is available to him, and we will sell this idea.  
“But,” he said, “Unless those three come together, it doesn’t happen.”   
I asked Mr. Gravell how he would compare the value of fingerprint checks 
or other biometrics to the value of DNA profiles.  He said the problem with 
fingerprints is that, notwithstanding the EBTS (Electronic Biometric Transmission 
Specification) and all the rest of these long-standing standards in fingerprints, 
we’ve still got Jesse James’s fingerprints somewhere, on a piece of yellowing 
paper card.  He said a fingerprint is handicapped by its age, and that iris would 
have been a better example for me to cite.  He said a commercial company 
called Iridian invented iris scan technology and locked the technology down hard.  
Iridian held those patents, locked up like a drum, and would not license them 
unless you made a deal.  Gravell said for that reason the government banned 
advocacy of iris technology in program proposals by vendors because 
government never wants to be captive to proprietary technology.  He said that 
through the life of the patent, Iridian refused to license it.   
Gravell made the analogy to Beta versus VHS.  He said Betamax, by most 
peoples’ opinions, was a superior technology standard, but Betamax never 
licensed it.  They always insisted you had to buy their unique hardware with their 
proprietary standard.  VHS, on the other hand, immediately licensed it to 
anybody, primarily IBM, and IBM has a long-standing business process of 
interoperability based on standards.  Therefore, he said, VHS became a standard 
that took over the whole market, and Beta perished.   
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Although iris scan technology was extremely attractive, Gravell noted that 
Iridian locked everybody out of the intellectual property until the patent expired, in 
2003 or 2004, at which point the iris market exploded.  Gravell pointed out that at 
the recent Biometric Consortium Conference there were as many iris-based 
identity companies as anything else.  He said that three years ago that was not 
the case; three years ago, they were down there saying, “We’re starving and 
we’re hopeful.”  Iris technology, Gravell says, benefits from the fact that it 
emerges.   
He explained that Iridian created the first iris database at a time when 
people had been thinking about iris for the many years that the patent existed.  
Gravell said people thought about what they would do with it and how it they 
could use it.  He said there was a bottled up need and demand but also an ability 
to intellectualize without investing in infrastructure that they would later have to 
correct.  He said from day one, they knew what they wanted and they began to 
go out and build it out.  As a result, iris technology has developed in an 
enormously rapid timeline.  From the beginning, all iris technology has been 
interoperable, because they did what Gravell suggested.  During that waiting 
period, he said, they created a range of standards, before anybody had built any 
of the enabling databases, and so everyone immediately embraced the 
standards and every iris sample collected on earth is interoperable from the 
beginning.  That is the model and the object lesson, Gravell says  
This might not work with DNA though, Gravell pointed out, because DNA 
is not a singularity.  There is so-called full DNA, there is mitochondrial DNA, there 
is nuclear; that is the problem, he said.  He noted that the government must sort 
this out, not in technology, but in policy and standards 
Gravell mentioned that the world’s largest physical repository of DNA is in 
Rockville, Maryland.  He said there are approximately 1.2 million physical DNA 
samples in the world’s largest freezer.  These samples, held by the medical 
community, are for DoD forensic purposes.  Gravell noted that they are physical 
DNA samples, not coded DNA.  Congress and the Army mandated such 
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regulation to protect the DNA from potential use for law enforcement or other 
purposes.  The DNA is there explicitly for purposes of medical forensics and 
identification of remains of U.S. military personnel 
When I asked if he knew if anyone had ever exploited the DNA that is 
stored there, Gravell stressed that law forbids its exploitation.  He said it has 
been around for a couple of decades now.  Gravell pointed out that they started 
with an extremely cautious and tentative understanding of the possibilities and 
built an extremely stringent policy regime and physical build-out around it.   
I asked Gravell how he felt about the ability of DHS, working with the FBI, 
DoD and others, to maintain the strict privacy standards and record of integrity 
that the FBI has maintained with their DNA database over the past 20 years.  He 
responded that there are competing interests in this scenario.  The first is the 
interest in data-sharing, interoperability, basic standards.  He said there is a 
move to bring these data environments together but it suffers from the problem 
that he alluded to earlier; the standards preexisted before anyone gave serious 
thought to making them interoperable.  
Gravell said that DHS, DoD and DOJ each have relationships with 
external partners. DHS, for example, in the US-VISIT program, shares 
information with the UK Home Office, conducting a counterpart program called 
UK E-Borders.  He said there is a deal between the two of them to permit the 
immediate, instantaneous sharing of border-crossing data between the United 
States and the United Kingdom.  The deal is that these two programs will share 
directly and not with larger data environments.  Gravell pointed out that although 
we can do that here, the UK Home Office also owns the criminal database and 
the criminal justice process.  Therefore, a counterpart program, called “UK-Ident 
One,” holds similar data.  In addition, Gravell said, the British Home Office uses 
the criminal database to support its border-crossing program, whereas DHS is 
not sharing with FBI in real time, while the UK is.  Furthermore, under their 
governance system, the British Government has leased access for its identity 
records to commercial enterprises to support reduction of banking fraud.  
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Therefore, banks can lease access, for a fee, to the UK Home Office database, 
which includes the criminal plus border crossing plus health care, the entire data 
environment, in order to reduce banking fraud, and support identifiability in 
banking.   
Gravell pointed out that if we did something like that, people would be 
marching in the streets.  It is a difference in the governance process.  The British 
do that in order to reduce the costs to the government of running the system, 
because the banks pay fees into it in order to do this.  Further, Gravell said, the 
British Government, as a signatory to the Schengen Agreement, has access to 
the 25 nations of Europe that are signatories of Schengen.  These countries, he 
noted, have all created a regime under the Madrid declaration that by the end of 
2010 there will be an interoperable, shareable database for all the European 
nations—the Schengen Agreement nations—for border crossing.  Therefore, the 
British Government has far more connectivity than its counterparts do.  The U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security has that link, but it cannot share that data with 
the FBI, says Gravell, so the FBI, meanwhile, works with INTERPOL and tries to 
obtain that data.  The strongest tie is DoD/DOJ, based upon the events in Iraq.  
Gravell noted that as the DoD went from zero and began to build out explosively 
in 2003, it looked for partnerships.  The FBI had always been the biggest dog in 
town, so the DoD immediately began to tie into the FBI.  Therefore, for the DoD, 
DHS and DOJ to combine will complicate preexisting arrangements they have 
with all the other nations.  
 Meanwhile, Gravell noted, the DoD sponsors something called the TSCP 
(Transglobal Secure Collaboration Program). The United States, United Kingdom 
and Canada created this, he said, to collaborate on the design and building of the 
joint strike fighter.  All those nations had to have classified access to portions of 
the program even while Lockheed Martin was trying to build it.  The TSCP was 




couple of others.  Gravell said that these people are all cross-credentialed with 
British and Canadians who have access into this system, making it a unique 
system with differentiating standards.   
Gravell added that while working on the NSTC Report they discovered 
that at least six cabinet-level U.S. federal departments are simultaneously 
engaging in identity management standards work under no commonality and 
generally without being aware of each other.  Those include DOJ; DHS; DoD; 
Commerce, which owns the National Institute of Standards and Technology; the 
DOS, which by law supervises international relations (the ITU-T is a UN 
organization, so DOS oversees its identity management work); and the 
Intelligence Community.  Therefore, he said, Justice, Homeland, Defense, 
Commerce, State and the IC are all simultaneously conducting international 
negotiation in identity management standards and information sharing, but not 
always in coordination with each other. 
I asked Mr. Gravell how he believes we might win over opponents to 
expanded DNA testing who say it is a violation of Fourth Amendment rights to 
privacy.  He pointed out that we have two kinds of people to consider.  First, we 
have the people that have to spend money on doing it, which are a powerful 
voting block in their own right.  Then we have the people that have to support it 
politically and personally, by adoption of what will ultimately be a voluntary 
standard.  Therefore, he said, you have to frame the case in different terms but 
you have to do both of those things.     
I pointed out that Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR) is on the table 
for discussion this year or next, and asked Mr. Gravell if he believes that DNA 
testing might play a role in any future CIR.  He said that he did not believe that it 
would be a leading factor.  He cannot believe that someone who seeks to enter 
the United States for economic or family reasons would refuse to do so because 
they might have their DNA taken, unless they have some history that they would 
not want revealed.  Gravell said it just seems counterintuitive.  He said that 
maybe those who would wish to prevent the emergence of a comprehensive 
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immigration policy might cite privacy considerations related to DNA as a reason 
for that objection, but that is a red herring.  He believes the best way is to 
separate DNA.   
Gravell said that here he thinks that Newt Gingrich was absolutely correct 
when he suggested that one reason that comprehensive health care is struggling 
is because it is comprehensive.   He said that leaves too many opportunities for 
someone who objects on any level to any part of it to impede progress.  On the 
other hand, he noted, if you dissected it into a set of narrowly drawn, topically 
specific measures, you can isolate objectors, harness beneficiaries, and check 
the box and get it done.  Take the issues one by one.  As Newt Gingrich and 
others point out, Gravell said, health care accounts for about sixteen percent of 
the GDP.  How can one imagine writing a single law that profoundly affects a fifth 
of the whole GDP?  Gravell believes that immigration reform is likely to be the 
same.  He said there is an emotional and political sexiness to the notion that we 
are going have a sweeping vision that is going to resolve everything all at once.  
He suggests that is bad government and, although he was a political science 
major, he cannot point to many cases where that has ever succeeded.   
Gravell recommends separating the identifiability issue and concentrating 
on the benefits to the nation, the individual, and the vendors.  He said, “If it 
happens to coincide with some comprehensive immigration reform, fine.”   
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS—Interview with William Gravell 
What factors might promote the diffusion of innovative DNA 
technology to help USCIS establish identity, protect against immigration 
fraud and human trafficking, and enhance security checks that will protect 
the public against criminals and terrorists? Gravell could not stress enough 
the importance of reaching out to the public to gain social acceptance of the idea 
from the beginning.  He cautioned that we must recognize the social sensitivity 
and stigma attached to DNA and use a strong fact-based messaging campaign 
to assuage public concern and dispel ignorance.  Gravell noted that USCIS must 
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do a good job of showing the many benefits of DNA testing to its stakeholders 
and assuring them that their information is well protected.   He also said that one 
of the most important roles the government can play is to promote the 
establishment of standards, both within the United States and internationally.   
What are the financial incentives and the benefits of up-front DNA testing 
to USCIS stakeholders?  According to Gravell, “Identity management will be 
valued when end users see the value.” This means that USCIS stakeholders 
must see the benefits, and see that the process is easier, faster and more 
secure.  What are the legal and privacy issues that USCIS must consider, 
and what policy, regulatory or legislative changes are needed? Gravell 
noted that technology will lead policy, and that the understanding of privacy will 
be tested as new technologies appear.  He pointed out that in telephony’s 
beginning no one had an expectation of privacy when speaking on a telephone; 
the privacy laws only changed as technology improved.  Gravell said that there is 
little case law on privacy and that the Congressional underpinning of privacy is 
not explicit.  He noted that the right to own a gun is more explicit than the right to 
privacy.  He provided as an example the procedure for purchasing an automatic 
weapon in Virginia.  It someone wants to purchase such a weapon he must 
submit to a background check, be fingerprinted, and register the weapon.  
Likewise, if someone wants to work for the government he has to undergo a 
similar procedure to obtain a security clearance.  Gravell acknowledged that the 
voluntary nature of applying for an immigration benefit would be similar to those 
situations.   How can interagency collaboration play a role in this effort and 
benefit from it? Gravell noted that interoperability begins with standards, and 
said that everyone needs to codify a DNA sample in the same way.  He 
cautioned that when creating standards, one should ensure that the technology 
and implementation are achievable.  Although he acknowledged doing so may 
sometimes be difficult, he stressed the importance of addressing “the standards 
first.” Gravell believes that the international community realizes the value and the 
need to share data.  He said that need is driving a global movement toward 
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technological standardization of data.  Gravell believes the United States should 
use its influence to sponsor standards activities and to invest in research and 
development.  He pointed out some of the complications that may arise because 
of various existing information-sharing agreements between separate U.S. 
agencies or their components, and foreign countries. What role might DNA 
testing play in any future comprehensive immigration reform?  Gravell did 
not see any reason to tie DNA testing to immigration reform.  He said to move 
forward on the separate DNA issue by concentrating on the benefits of DNA 
testing.  “If it happens to coincide with some comprehensive immigration reform, 
fine,” he said. 
3. Gray 
Dr. Myra Gray has been the Director of the Department of Defense’s 
Biometrics Task Force since July 2007.  I interviewed her in Arlington, Virginia on 
October 21, 2009.  After providing background on my thesis and explaining that 
submission of fingerprints for security checks is already a condition of applying 
for many immigration benefits, I asked Dr. Gray if she believed submission of 
DNA would be vastly different. 
Dr. Gray pointed out that the difference with DNA is that you can get more 
from it than just the identity of the person.  She said you could get their family 
relationships, sometimes the regions that they are from; sometimes you can get 
health data on people.  She stressed that an agency would definitely have to 
handle it with a bit more sensitivity than if they were taking only fingerprints.  Dr. 
Gray did acknowledge, however, that DNA is the gold standard in identification.  
She said it is unique, and pointed out that only identical twins would have the 
same DNA, noting that in such a case you could differentiate with fingerprints 
other biometrics.  Dr. Gray noted that all biometric modalities have different 
pluses and different minuses, which is what makes them so valuable when you 
work them together in a multimodal environment.   
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I asked Dr. Gray what she believed might be the major legal and privacy 
issues that must be considered in any expansion of DNA testing in the 
immigration process.  She responded that we first must think about how the laws 
apply to U.S. persons.  She said “U.S. persons” has a very specific legal 
definition; it includes people who are here for long-term residence, or U.S. 
citizens.  However, she said if the goal in this process is immigration, and this 
person is applying to obtain long-term residence status with the eventual goal of 
becoming a citizen, you would probably have to handle it as privacy information.  
That, she said, is because of the different information that you can get out of 
DNA.  She acknowledged that there might be some leeway, since such 
applicants are not yet in permanent immigration status.  Dr. Gray thought this 
status might allow more flexibility to check the data against terrorist, arrest, and 
possibly other databases.  She said there might be more prohibitions against 
checking such data for a U.S. person, but Dr. Gray felt that we should be able to 
do some prescreening or pre-checking before granting status that would give 
them the “U.S. person” benefits and privileges. 
I mentioned to Dr. Gray a December 2008 article indicating that the 
Department of Defense had 80,000 terrorist profiles in their DNA database, and 
an October 2008 article that said INTERPOL had 85,000 DNA profiles for 
criminals and terrorists.  I asked her, based on her role on the Biometrics Task 
Force, what she believes are the main issues surrounding the use of DNA testing 
to screen potential immigrants against the DoD, INTERPOL and FBI data sets.  
She said she would first want to make sure that everyone is using the same 
standards.  She stressed the importance of identifying what portion of the DNA 
you are going to check.  She said if one nation collects on a certain number of 
loci and another one checks on different loci, or they use different kinds of DNA, 
such as mitochondrial versus nuclear,  “then you’re pretty much at loss when 
everything is digitized, on being able to do that magic.”  She said it is like apples 
and oranges, even though it is DNA.  Dr. Gray advised that the way around that 
is to try to have the most comprehensive data that you can and to settle on the 
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international standards and then adopt them worldwide.  She said everybody 
should know “this is what you do.”  The FBI should not be doing one thing while 
State does another and local law enforcement does something else, and 
INTERPOL uses yet another method.  Dr. Gray stressed the importance of 
making sure that, as an international community, everyone agrees on what 
standards to use.   
I asked her if the various entities were working on standards right now.  
She said she did not know if the law enforcement community was working on this 
issue, but she did know that the DNA community is working on it.  She said they 
are working on standards, and on where they best apply, because certain types 
of DNA are better for different purposes.  That is the goal, Dr. Gray said, and she 
believes that everyone is working toward it, but she could not say specifically 
what the different communities are doing.   
Dr. Gray’s second recommendation would be in the policy arena; she said 
it is important to have the permissions to check against each other’s data.  She 
said that, of course, applies to any modality or any database.  “Just because you 
have data, it is not as though you can check it against anybody’s database.  Nor 
would you want to.  You are entrusted to protect this data—not just use it for your 
own desires.” 
She said we must make sure we have the authority for every check we 
make.  Dr. Gray pointed out we have plenty of authorities, but she cautioned not 
to assume authority.  She noted INTERPOL and the FBI already have many 
agreements.  She said her task force, through the FBI channel, could now also 
link up with INTERPOL.  She said many of her connections with other databases 
are through the links the FBI has already set up.    
I asked Dr. Gray if she believed the DoD would be willing to allow DHS to 
screen potential immigrants against the DoD terrorist database.  Dr. Gray was 
quick to point out they do not have a terrorist database, per se.  She said they do 
not call it a terrorist database because it contains many types of persons of 
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interest.  She said they might be foreign nationals who are working for us in 
theater.  She stressed the database consists of “non-U.S. persons,” and said the 
database also contains people who are on our side and helping us.  Dr. Gray 
said part of the benefit of having an interagency construct is because no agency 
is a stovepipe.  She stressed the only way we can have good, solid, integrated 
national security is if DoD has access to DHS, Department of State, Department 
of Justice, and vice-versa.  She said we should all be able to check, as 
appropriate, not just carte blanche, but as appropriate, each other’s databases.  
For instance, she said if Customs and Border Protection picks up somebody 
crossing the border, it would be nice to know if they have applied for a visa, if 
they have an arrest warrant, or if they used to be someone who planted IEDs.  All 
three of those are in the “other” databases.   
Dr. Gray said an interagency working group exists specifically for the 
purpose of coming together and federating those databases.  She noted, 
however, that each agency has its own authorities.  She commented,  
I don’t have the authorities to hold data on Joe the 711 robber who 
steals cigarettes there, but the FBI does.  The FBI, they don’t have 
the authority to hold data on people who just apply for visas or who 
applied to work overseas, but I may, and the Department of State 
may.  However, it is through that federation of saying, ‘can we 
check?’ that you get the true power.  And we are working hard, we 
the community, not just DoD, but our partners in the other agencies 
and departments, are working very hard on this one. 
Dr. Gray noted that without a cohesive U.S. government approach toward 
national security, we would have a problem, adding, “It is the seams between us 
that they sneak through.”  She assured me they have had some successes in 
this area.   
I asked Dr. Gray how she views the ability of local, state, tribal, federal 
and international partners to achieve interoperability in this area.  She said she 
feels very good about it, adding, “Everyone understands the value of standards, 
and they are driving toward it.”  She noted they still need to tweak the process 
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and to work out some policy issues, but she said everyone understands the value 
of being part of a federated approach instead of a stovepipe of excellence.  She 
said she feels very good because everyone understands the standards are the 
Rosetta Stone. The standards make the difference between what we can 
communicate with each other.  She is glad everyone is striving toward that.  She 
noted they are not saying, “Well, we are INTERPOL, or we are California; we 
don’t want you to know what we know.”   
Instead, she said, they are saying, “I want you to check, because you may 
be the person who catches my bad guy.”   
Dr. Gray said she has observed a bit of a paradigm shift on the willingness 
of agencies to share information when appropriate and when authorized.  She 
sees the lack of standardized resources as the biggest challenge in the internal 
data sharing.  She said, “We have all of these different areas with different, 
varying levels of expertise, varying funding levels; I mean, how many places are 
there that can afford what you see when you watch CSI?”   
She said in real life it is not like CSI and in real life, some of these places 
do not even have a DNA capability; or if they do, they use it only on major cases.  
Dr. Gray quipped, “It’s not automatic like you see on TV where they’ve got, like a 
kabillion swabs from everybody that’s done anything.” 
According to Dr. Gray, the funding issues really could cripple such an 
endeavor.  She noted that the richer districts and precincts might very well have 
a capability that really is not even achievable in some of the other areas.  She 
said she does not know if the tribal communities even have that kind of 
databases, and thought they might just rely on the local and state authorities 
around them.  Dr. Gray believes it is harder in the tiny, poor districts.  She said at 
the international level there are areas where it would be harder too, but there are 
options.  For instance, NATO is a collection of nations working together toward 
the common good of the world.  Dr. Gray believes that through the NATO 
community we can agree to some standard of how we are going to process DNA.  
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She said, even if you do not have the entire world, you have a major portion of 
people already pointed in the same direction.  She noted this at least provides a 
mechanism by which we can negotiate and determine a common path forward.   
Comparing the national versus international information-sharing 
capabilities, Dr. Gray said we do not necessarily have something that can be 
achievable at the state and local level.  Using the example of NATO again, she 
noted sometimes the richer countries help the poorer countries so they can all 
work together.  She said she did not see such cooperation going on at the state 
level, where some of the richer states are saying, "Well let me send a check over 
to you so we can work this together."  
I asked Dr. Gray what she felt are the potential negative implications of 
implementing such an information-sharing system with state, local, tribal, federal 
and international partners.  She responded, “If the construct is kept where you 
are checking against other peoples' appropriately authorized and held data and 
you are not thinking you are going to take a copy of it, I don’t see a thing wrong 
with it.” 
Dr. Gray reminded me that she had been discussing two important things.  
First, we would only store those things that our mission authorizes us to store.  
Second, we would only check against another database when we have an 
authorization to do so.  If those two things come into play, she said, you will not 
have violations, you will not have this “Big Brother” thing, and you will not have 
Privacy Act problems.  She stressed that those two things are what keeps things 
focused.  She said that you run into trouble when you think just because you 
have a database you should put everybody in it, noting that some say, "If you’re 
not guilty, what have you got to worry about?” 
Dr. Gray pointed out that we are innocent until proven guilty, first, and 
secondly, there is the issue of unreasonable search and seizure.  She said this is 
a virtual mechanism for search and seizure.  She stressed the importance of 
ensuring that we store, match, and share only where authorized.   
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Specifically addressing the issue as it relates to immigration, Dr. Gray said 
if people were applying to immigrate to the United States, you would think they 
are good guys, but they may not be.  She said in order to protect our nation we 
would want to conduct reasonable checks against the DNA that the DoD is 
collecting from IEDs and against the DNA that the FBI has collected from 
arrestees.  She believes that is reasonable.   
I explained to Dr. Gray that the proposed use of DNA testing for 
immigration purposes would cover not only initial admission requirements but 
also eligibility to remain in the United States.  If a person commits a crime after 
admission, the government could remove him or her because of that crime.  
Later, when a permanent resident applies for U.S. citizenship, he or she must 
prove good moral character, so we usually take naturalization applicants’ 
fingerprints and run them through FBI databases.  I told Dr. Gray that we look at 
the whole period before they become U.S. citizens.   
Dr. Gray responded that if DNA testing is part of the vetting process as a 
condition of the benefit, and if we have vetted this policy through our lawyers, 
there should be no problem with it.  She seemed to think that as long as DNA 
testing is not arbitrary, as long as it is not personal, it should be considered within 
the bounds of the law.  We should follow standard procedures, she advised, and 
follow them for everybody, not just with some.  Dr Gray sees the need to 
consider very seriously the legal and policy decisions to determine what should 
happen once a person becomes a citizen.  Should we remove their data?  She 
commented,  
Well, I know what my opinion would be; it would be of course you 
do, because my data is not in there and I am a U.S. citizen, and if 
that person has passed the ticket…  But the world is a weird place 
and I am going to leave that up to the smarter people.  I’m thankful I 
don’t have to address that one, because if it was me, I’d want that 
data out when I become a citizen so that I’m not undergoing illegal 
search and seizure.  Hopefully the vetting process is good and we 
get rid of the non-positives before we get to the point of having 
them sworn in. 
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I asked Dr. Gray to compare the value of fingerprint checks or other 
biometrics to the value of DNA profiles.  She pointed out that each modality has 
its positive and each modality has its weakness.  She said some modalities lend 
themselves to very quick throughput, and she used as an example iris scans.  
She said with iris scans you can have a whole lot of people come through a door 
really fast, just looking, and it lets them in.  She said a fingerprint is also good for 
that, but not as good as an iris.  She pointed out the weakness in iris is when 
people commit crimes they do not leave their iris behind.  She said they leave 
DNA, they leave fingerprints, and sometimes cameras capture videos or pictures, 
for instance, from an ATM camera.  That, she said, is where facial recognition 
comes in, if it is good enough video, and where the fingerprints come in, pulling 
latents and matching to others; that is where your DNA comes in.  However, she 
said, “You wouldn’t use DNA for access, because then it would be like that 
movie, Gattaca, where, coming through, you get your finger poked every day.  
That’s ridiculous.” 
Dr. Gray said you receive the real benefits of biometrics when you link the 
modalities together in a multimodality construct.  She said you may be 90 percent 
sure that this iris belongs to this person, and 90 percent sure that this fingerprint 
belongs to this person, but if you have both their iris and their fingerprint, you can 
be 99 percent sure that you have the right person.  So, she says, if someone 
wants access to some super secret underground nuclear bunker, you would want 
to check fingerprints, irises, voice, face, and do the whole thing.  DNA, she said, 
cannot be collected at a distance, so may not be appropriate in this particular 
instance.   
I asked Dr. Gray how she felt about the ability of DHS, working with the 
FBI, DoD and others, to maintain the strict privacy standards and record of 
integrity that the FBI has maintained with their DNA database over the past 20 
years.  I clarified that as far as I know, as far as I have read, nobody at the FBI 
has sold anybody’s DNA information to anybody or abused it.  They have kept 
the privacy standards.  They have strict rules for storing, accessing and 
 67
protecting the data.  Dr. Gray said she felt very good about this.  She said she 
does not think there is a problem at all, as long as you look at the standards and 
apply them appropriately.   She noted that there is one set of standards when 
you are going to go to court and another set of standards when you are just 
trying to identify.  Therefore, the standards themselves, she said, may be 
different. 
She said that protecting the data might be a little different too.  For 
instance, she may have a database that includes fingerprints of people who want 
to walk through that door.  “Well, I certainly want to have that database.  I don’t 
want somebody to tell me I can’t have it because some of my employees are 
U.S. persons, or I can’t have it in this space because I’m not under armed guard 
or something.” 
Dr. Gray said you have to apply the reasonability test.  She said in 
general, when you talk about protecting the data, it is not just about protecting 
the rights of the individuals you have the data on; it is also about protecting the 
mission of the organization  holding the data.  She warned about the possibility of 
entities damaging the DHS mission by messing with the integrity of the DHS 
database, letting out copies of the database, or adding unauthorized information 
to the database.  Dr. Gray stressed that protecting the integrity of the database is 
“the lifeblood of this business, because you have to be able to trust it and trust it 
fully.” 
Dr. Gray believes all the other agencies and departments could be just as 
successful as the FBI in protecting DNA data.   
Reportedly, the Department of Defense has collected DNA samples from 
U.S. soldiers for many years, for use in identifying casualties. I asked Dr. Gray 
about this, and about whether there had been complaints from the soldiers 
regarding the requirement to submit their DNA.  She said she has never heard of 
any complaints.  I asked if the data had ever been misused.  She said no, and 
pointed out that it has a very specific use.  She said the way the process works is 
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when they have a casualty then they run a DNA sample to make sure that it 
really is the person that they think it is and that there is no mix-up.  They want to 
make sure someone did not put the uniform on a local national or something.  Dr. 
Gray assured me that they are very focused, and that they do not use the DNA 
for medical experiments or for anything like that.  “It’s specifically used in this 
case, and we need that,” she said 
I asked if she would say that the DoD has a good record for protecting 
DNA samples or profiles.  She said DoD has a great record, and pointed out that 
is because they have very tight rules on that.  Dr. Gray identified two kinds of 
DNA records that DoD has.  First, they keep DNA on their service members.  
Second, they keep a database of non-U.S. persons.  These people might work 
for us, or they may be detainees or other persons of interest.  Dr. Gray stressed 
the service member and non-U.S.-person databases are two separate types of 
records and are never mixed. 
I questioned Dr. Gray further on the non-U.S. persons' database.  She 
said they do not tag the persons as “good” or “bad.”  She pointed out any 
biometric is agnostic, noting a biometric does not tell you if a person is good or 
bad; it just tells you an identity.  She said somebody else has to apply that 
judgment on it.  As an example, she said maybe the Intel community is saying, 
“This is a bad guy” because they have a modality identifying him from an IED, or 
“this is a good guy” because this person is telling us things.   
Dr. Gray stressed that the data is strictly agnostic.  It will help to identify.  
Then you have to verify.  She said it is the associated data or the contextual data 
that makes a difference.   
When I asked Dr. Gray if she believes we could expand DNA testing for 
immigration purposes while still considering the privacy concerns of the 
immigrant population, she said she needed more information about the current 
process.  I explained that right now we take photographs and run name checks 
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for all applicants for permanent residence or citizenship and that we just take 
fingerprints for those people between certain ages.  
She suggested for immigration purposes to use fingerprints, face, and a 
DNA swab.  Depending upon what the legal community said, once the intending 
immigrant becomes a “U.S. person” we might want to put it inactive or something 
like that, she added.  Dr. Gray thinks those three modalities would probably be all 
we would need. She did not think that we would need some of the other more 
bizarre modalities.   
Dr. Gray said one good point about DNA is it can verify familial ties.  She 
noted it could be especially useful in the immigration context since we often grant 
immigration benefits based upon relationships.  I mentioned that I was concerned 
about the number of 13-year-old girls we interviewed in Africa whose alleged 
fathers had petitioned for them.  These girls had never met, and knew practically 
nothing about their alleged fathers.  Dr. Gray acknowledged the value of DNA 
testing in the immigration arena because it helps add strength to fraud prevention 
and human smuggling.  She said, though, that she would only do swabs, rather 
than blood samples to obtain DNA.   
Dr. Gray also acknowledged the potential value to our intelligence 
community of DNA testing in the immigration process.  She said, for instance, 
that the IC could say, “This is Saddam’s three sons and here is what they are 
doing.”  
I asked Dr. Gray how she believes we might win over opponents to 
expanded DNA testing who say it is a violation of Fourth Amendment rights to 
privacy.  First, she said she would codify the exact process for checking the data.  
She said that we have to assure the public this is not just a random check 
whenever we feel like it.  Instead, she said, we must show we have a certain set 
of authorities that we use and we will only check the data in those cases.  Dr. 
Gray said these measures would comfort people, knowing that we are not going 
to collect their DNA and then use it to hunt them down for the rest of their lives.  
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She raised the question of what Hitler might have done with this kind of data.  
She said that he could have been much more effective in his reign of terror.  Dr. 
Gray pointed out that people have an innate fear of turning over their very 
identity.   
Second, Dr. Gray said she would implement the expansion in phases.  
She suggested, for instance, starting with people from a certain region of the 
world, possibly a region where there is a critical need to be able to verify family 
relationships.  She said to run it as a trial, see what happens, and then expand it 
from there.   
I asked Dr. Gray if, given all of these issues, she believes it is feasible to 
implement DNA technology to establish identity, protect against immigration 
fraud and human smuggling, and enhance security checks that will protect the 
public.  Her response was,  
Absolutely, but, one of the things that will have to really be 
strengthened is chain of custody on the samples.  You have to 
figure out where you are going to take the samples, and then from 
that point on, have positive control.  Otherwise, they’re going to 
take a sample, you’re going to get 48 samples that are just alike 
because they took them all from the neighborhood boy who is 
sitting down there selling newspapers or something.  You have to 
have the utmost of integrity on chain of custody on that data or it 
will not be worth anything.  
I told Dr. Gray the plan was for the people who are already in the United 
States to go to the USCIS Application Support Centers (ASCs) where people go 
now to be fingerprinted and photographed for their benefits.  The ASC would take 
their fingerprints, photographs and DNA swabs at the same time, to tie them all 
together.  Such people may already be in the United States for one reason or 
another and are applying for adjustment of status or petitioning for a child, 
parent, sibling or another family member overseas. 
Dr. Gray was concerned that we may have trouble collecting and linking 
DNA from “U.S. persons” to other databases.  I suggested that we could possibly 
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specify that for U.S. citizens we would only use the sample to prove the 
relationship.  She thought that might be a good solution.  I said if we had already 
taken a petitioner’s DNA when he immigrated to the United States, we would 
have it on file and would not need to take a new sample when he petitions for 
other family members.  Instead, we could just match it against the person for 
whom he is petitioning.  We could say, “Oh, yes, this is definitely your mother.  
Your petition is approved.” 
Dr. Gray said our legal people would really have to work through this area 
of U.S.-citizen DNA.  I pointed out that we already have the authority to 
fingerprint some U.S. citizen petitioners under the Adam Walsh laws because 
some people petition for women who have children in order to bring them here 
and then abuse the children.  Dr. Gray said that is something to keep in mind and 
again stressed the importance of using our legal team.  She said they are able to 
give you the necessary capabilities if you need to put U.S. persons in the 
database.  There are certain times when you would want to put a U.S. person in 
the database.  Get legal authorization for it before you do it and then you can.   
Dr. Gray said there might be times, under special circumstances, when we 
would want someone in the database who would not traditionally be in it.  She 
said if a soldier disappears overseas or becomes missing in action, the DoD 
would want to have the soldier’s data available in case someone comes upon 
him.  She said, “Just get Legal to help you walk through it.  They’ll be your best 
friends.” 
I told Dr. Gray that currently no regulations exist to allow USCIS or the 
Department of State to require DNA testing in immigration or visa cases.  
Instead, applicants and petitioners submit DNA on a voluntary basis, usually as a 
last resort, when the evidence is insufficient and it appears that the government 
will deny the application or petition otherwise.  So it is being used at times, I said, 
but there have been problems with the chain of custody.  I mentioned that DOS 
has just amended the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) in an effort to strengthen the 
integrity of the process overseas.  DOS now requires that overseas collection of 
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DNA samples take place at the U.S. embassy in the presence of a cleared 
American employee (U.S. Department of State [USDOS], 2009).  Dr. Gray 
agreed this process would be a big improvement over the current one. 
She raised the issue of one state with a law that forbids denying benefits 
or hampering someone’s ability to go into work by virtue of a person refusing to 
provide biometrics. She said there was a person who actually had a DoD badge 
in that state without a picture on it.  Dr. Gray thinks that policy was unreasonable 
and believes that they eventually reversed it.  I said I thought every U.S. 
government employee must submit to fingerprinting.  She said the case in point 
was a bizarre case that was guided by state law, and believes that particular 
case might have been pre-911.  She noted that she did not believe the law 
applied to obtaining a driver’s license, thinking a case on that issue came down 
to the notion of a privilege versus a right.  They said, “If you want to drive, you 
have your picture taken.” 
In closing, Dr. Gray again stressed the importance of working closely with 
our lawyers.  She said, “They will be your greatest nemesis and your best friend, 
because they’ll make you think through the hard issues.  But don’t let them say 
‘No’; Make them help you get to ‘Yes.’”   
She said counsel’s first answer would probably be that we could not do 
any of this.  She advised us to then lay out our objectives and point out that we 
need DNA to prove familial relationships, and ask them to tell us how to do it.  
Then, she said, we should make them walk us through it with the right procedure, 
the right constraints, whatever it is.  She said we should make them do the hard 
work to come up with the scenario where we can use this capability, but not 
abuse it, and get what we need to do our mission.   
“And you will get there,” Dr. Gray said.  “You will get there.  It is very 
exciting.  I certainly hope that they do this.” 
She warned that we would have to do this very sensitively because some 
people may be scared of these environments.  She pointed out that immigrants 
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often come from places where there is no freedom, there is a lot of fear, and 
there is tyranny.  Some of them, she said, may think that the government will 
track them.  However, she noted, that is not how it is. 
Dr. Gray feels much depends on how you present the idea, and said we 
might want to present it as a benefit or an enabler.  “You are enabling somebody 
to become a citizen.  That is what you are doing.”  She thought such an approach 
would be better than saying, “We’re going to check you out, because we know 
that you’re bad,” and then, “Oh, by the way, we’re going to keep hunting you 
down later.” 
Dr. Gray advised me to focus on the presentation.  She said we might 
want to twist it a little, and explain how we will help them prove they have a valid 
family member who deserves to come over here and be with them.  She said we 
should assure them we are going to help them bring the family member and that 
DNA testing is going to enable it.  Then, she said, we must tell them the 
circumstance under which we will use that data and how we will get rid of it when 
they become a U.S. citizen, or whatever the legal decision turns out to be.   
I pointed out that there are legitimate applicants who live in countries 
where birth certificates are very unreliable or where many of the births are never 
registered.  Those people might really welcome the ability to go straight to DNA 
testing and get it over with, instead of wasting time and money trying to buy fake 
documents that we keep rejecting.   
Dr. Gray agreed, and said the other thing she wanted to stress was the 
importance of chain of custody.  She said the number one thing is going to be 
protecting the DNA and the database.  As soon as somebody tampers with it 
then the integrity of the database and everything you do with it comes under 




Dr. Gray said she thinks that expansion of DNA testing in the immigration 
process is an exciting endeavor, and she hopes that we can get it working.  She 
said the next step would be to figure out how we can check against the DoD 
data. 
I asked if the DoD currently shares with or checks against the FBI 
databases.  She said the FBI is her closest associate in the interagency 
construct, noting that her task force works with the FBI CJIS (Criminal Justice 
Information Services) database.  She pointed out that DNA is not as mature a 
modality as fingerprints and if we have a fingerprint and we already know some 
of the linkages with the other modalities, the results are a lot better.  However, 
she said, “We do have the capability to do DNA; it is just not as standard to run 
everything through the database all the time.   
I let Dr. Gray know we had been working with DHS Science and 
Technology lately on the rapid DNA project and said I understood DoD had also 
been working on it.  She said she is very excited about that new technology 
because the processing for DNA is so different.  She said right now, you end up 
with spit or blood instead of a print that you can instantly just stick in the 
computer.  She thought the possibility of up-front processing with the rapid DNA 
machines is very promising.   
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS—Interview with Dr. Myra Gray 
What factors might promote the diffusion of innovative DNA 
technology to help USCIS establish identity, protect against immigration 
fraud and human trafficking, and enhance security checks that will protect 
the public against criminals and terrorists? Dr. Gray noted that DNA is the 
gold standard in identification but said because DNA can provide more personal 
information than just identity we must handle the information carefully. She 
pointed out that USCIS must implement policies specifically outlining what the 
permissions are for collecting and using DNA.  She advised working carefully 
with our lawyers to ensure that the policies, procedures and regulations are 
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carefully developed.  If the public is to entrust the government to protect the data, 
the government must ensure they have the authority to access the data each 
time they do so.  She said codifying the process and assuring people that it will 
only be used for the stated purposes would help to comfort people, and 
acknowledged that some people have an innate fear of turning over their very 
identity.  She recommended implementing DNA testing in phases; for instance, 
she said to start out with a trial based on a critical need and see what happens 
and expand from there.  Dr. Gray added that before beginning, USCIS must be 
able to assure integrity in the chain of custody.  She stressed that much of the 
success of implementing the DNA testing will depend on how we present the 
idea.  What are the financial incentives and the benefits of up-front DNA 
testing to USCIS stakeholders?  Dr. Gray pointed out each biometric modality 
has its benefits and each has its weakness.  She said we could realize the real 
benefits of biometrics in a multimodality construct, where, for instance, we 
combine fingerprints, iris scans and DNA.  She noted a person does not leave his 
or her iris scan behind at a crime scene, and you cannot prove biological 
relationships with iris scans, but DNA is useful for those things.  On the other 
hand, at least for now, you cannot test the DNA of people as they pass through a 
doorway.  Gray believes in order to protect this nation, if someone is applying to 
immigrate to this country, it is reasonable to check their DNA against a database 
of DNA collected from IEDs or against the FBI’s criminal database. She said 
DNA has added value because it can verify relationships that are the basis for 
immigration benefits and that could also assist our intelligence community.  Dr. 
Gray considers the DNA expansion for immigration an exciting project and hopes 
that it will succeed.   What are the legal and privacy issues that USCIS must 
consider, and what policy, regulatory or legislative changes are needed? 
Dr. Gray thought it was reasonable, especially regarding people seeking “U.S. 
person” status, for USCIS to have the right to screen them before granting such 
status.  She thought the issue became less clear once an applicant becomes a 
U.S. permanent resident or citizen.  Stressing the importance of establishing 
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protocol, she said we should only store what our mission authorizes us to store 
and only check against other databases when we have the authorization to do 
so.  She said if we meet these two criteria, there should be no violations, no “Big 
Brother” accusations, and no Privacy Act problems.  To avoid accusations of 
unlawful search it is important to ensure that we store, match and share only 
where authorized.  Dr. Gray said if we continue to keep immigrants in the DNA 
database even after they become permanent residents, she thinks that is fine, as 
long as the process has been vetted, and as long as it applies to all in that 
situation.   However, she believes we should look carefully at the question of 
what to do with the profiles after the people have become U.S. citizens.  Dr. Gray 
sees no reason why DHS cannot be as successful as the FBI has been for years 
in protecting the databases and noted that protecting the integrity of the database 
is of the utmost importance.  She said the DoD has been storing DNA for U.S. 
military personnel for many years with no objections and no problems.  How can 
interagency collaboration play a role in this effort and benefit from it? The 
first priority for Dr. Gray would be that everyone is using the same standards 
worldwide.  She said without standards, information sharing is difficult if not 
impossible.  She noted that the FBI already has multiple agreements for 
information sharing, and said that her organization uses the long-established FBI 
links to connect to INTERPOL.  The FBI is her closest associate in information 
sharing and Gray would like to see USCIS be able to check against the DoD 
database as well.  Noting that no agency is a stovepipe, Dr. Gray believes the 
only way we can have good, solid, integrated national security is if the myriad 
U.S. agencies are able to check each other’s databases.  She said, “It is the 
seams between us that they sneak through.”  Gray pointed out, however, that the 
agencies should only check where appropriate and authorized.   She is confident 
that local, state, federal and international partners can achieve interoperability in 
this area, and said they continue to work toward this.  The parties are seeking 
common standards because they realize the benefits.  Dr. Gray believes some of 
the smaller jurisdictions, including the tribal authorities, may need financial and 
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other assistance to achieve capability in this area.  She thinks it might even be 
easier to achieve internationally because of foreign aid programs.    
4. Overall Interview Findings 
All of the experts interviewed agreed that it is feasible to expand the use of 
DNA testing in the immigration process while still maintaining a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  Here are some of the common themes: 
 The importance of establishing standards, and of coordinating the 
effort with partners to ensure interoperability; 
 The importance of cyber security and protecting the databases; 
 The  importance of public perception and marketing, making sure to 
focus on the benefits of the project; 
 The importance of maintaining integrity in the chain of custody; 
 The reality that current laws and regulations do not guide DNA 
testing in the immigration process and those will evolve as the 
technology is used and challenges arise; and 
 Although the FBI and the DoD have stored DNA samples for 
decades, they have never exploited or misused those samples 
because there are strict laws and safeguards in place to protect 
against the possibility. 
B. HAITI 
In Haiti, an unusually large percentage of applicants and petitioners resort 
to DNA testing.  For that reason, I visited Port au Prince in May 2009.  
Approximately forty percent of the births in Haiti are never registered.  In order to 
meet documentary requirements to provide a birth certificate, most Haitians try to 
obtain one by any means possible.  Often they are the victims of document 
vendors who charge high prices and provide documents that USCIS or DOS 
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reject as fraudulent.  Most legitimate applicants in such situations would prefer to 
go straight to DNA instead of wasting money to purchase documents that will not 
help them.  However, they often have to make every effort to provide birth 
certificates first and then resort to using other secondary documentary evidence.  
They usually can only volunteer for DNA testing as a last resort.  This means 
they waste money procuring documents and having them translated when they 
know that USCIS or the Department of State will probably reject them.  This 
process wastes the time of USCIS, DOS and their customers.     
The USCIS and DOS employees I spoke with in Haiti thought legitimate 
applicants as well as the officers who adjudicate the applications and petitions 
would welcome expansion of DNA testing early in the process.  Fraud in Haiti is 
rampant and almost no document can be trusted.  Officials there have 
discovered high rates of fraud through DNA testing.  When a consular officer 
suggests DNA testing in Haiti, the results, on average, verify approximately 30% 
of the relationships and disprove 30 percent, while 40 percent of the people 
never follow through with the testing.  This failure to follow through could be 
because the applicants or petitioners know DNA will reveal the fraud or it could 
be because they cannot afford the costs of the test.  Some people voluntarily 
provide the DNA, not realizing the power of the technology and believing that 
they can beat the test by chewing on a certain type of leaf.  The only down side 
any of the officers saw was the cost, because currently the costs using the AABB 
labs are very high.  DNA testing is valuable not only for visa cases but also for 
citizenship cases, where the child is seeking U.S. citizenship based on 
parentage. 
DNA testing is also useful in Haitian adoption cases in order to verify that 
the alleged parent who has given a child up for adoption is actually the parent of 
the child.  Adoptive parents (many of them American) pay $15,000-$30,000 for 
an adoption.  Some adoption lawyers in Haiti see this as a lucrative business and 
often obtain documents through fraud.  They encourage the Americans to bond 
with the child even though they know the child is not legitimately available for 
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adoption.  Sometimes people kidnap children and sell them for adoption, and the 
person claiming to be the biological parent who is giving the child up is not even 
related.   
I visited an orphanage in Port au Prince and spoke with the director about 
the use of DNA in adoption procedures.  The children’s biological parents, who 
are too poor to care for them, often leave them in the orphanage so that 
someone will feed and educate them.  Sometimes the biological parents give 
their children up for adoption in order for the children to have a better life.  The 
orphanage director said the children adopted from her orphanage go to one of 
three countries:  the Netherlands, France or the United States.  The Netherlands 
requires DNA testing early in the process for all children to ensure that the 
claimed parents who are relinquishing their children are truly the parents.  France 
does not require DNA testing.   For the U.S. cases, USCIS suggests DNA testing 
late in the process and in probably forty percent of the cases, she said.   
USCIS requires an informed consent interview with the birth parent(s) 
before processing the orphan petition in cases where a child’s parent is still alive 
and has relinquished the child.  During the interview, USCIS tells the biological 
parents they might never see their child again and that the child will never be 
able to petition for them.  This interview usually takes place late in the process.  
Sometimes the biological parents change their minds about relinquishing the 
child.  Often by this time, however, the prospective adoptive parents have visited 
the child in Haiti several times; they have become emotionally attached.  They do 
not want to accept that the adoption papers may not be legitimate or that the 
person who has relinquished the child is not even that child’s parent.  Most of 
these American prospective parents are not involved in fraud; they are just naive.  
It is clear USCIS should require the informed consent interview and DNA testing 
earlier in the process.  
One of the petitions USCIS officers adjudicate in Haiti is the I-730 
Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition.  A refugee or asylee in the United States may 
file this form to bring a spouse or child to the United States as a derivative asylee 
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or refugee.   In Haiti, the case size averages 6–10 children and approximately 80 
percent of the I-730s on behalf of children eventually lead to DNA testing.   
When requesting documents in Haiti, USCIS officials always tell people to 
go to government offices to obtain documents, not to a third party.  Often, 
however, someone outside the government office tries to “help” them and sells 
them documents.  U.S. officials reject such fraudulent documents.  Even if 
applicants seek the documents from a government office, USCIS says people in 
Haiti are often at a disadvantage because of the lack of availability of legitimate 
documents.  Sometimes the relationship is valid, but often by the time the person 
is able to prove it, it is too late.  DNA testing early in the process would help 
these people. 
For example, one following-to-join son of a HRIFA (Haitian Refugee 
Immigration Fairness Act) applicant came back with three different fraudulent 
documents.  He finally turned 21 and aged out, so was no longer eligible.  DHS 
tried to verify the document with the Haitian authorities and found that his birth 
was never on record.  However, it is estimated that possibly 40 percent of the 
births in Haiti are not recorded.  DNA could have proven this young man’s 
relationship to his parent, as long as the relationship existed.   
It is costly for USCIS to attempt to verify documents in Haiti.  Sometimes a 
USCIS officer has to drive six hours to reach a site, attempt to verify the 
documents, spend the night and drive back.  This takes officer time away from 
other cases, requires use of a government vehicle and the costs of a driver, gas, 
hotel and meals.  DNA testing early in the process would save such resources.  
The U.S. Government could save other resources with up-front DNA 
testing because it would not forward the visa petition files to the overseas 
locations if the DNA has already proven that the relationship does not exist.  The 
cost of shipping and storing files, not to mention the security implications of 
possessing those files in case of evacuation, are tremendous. 
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Every consular officer I spoke with agreed that DNA is a big deterrent to 
fraud.  Some said they are concerned about the integrity of the collection process 
in the U.S.  They wanted to know if government employees witness the collection 
of DNA samples in the United States, as they soon will be required to do in Haiti.   
American Association of Blood Banks (AABB)-certified labs in the United 
States use two facilities in Haiti to collect DNA samples for U.S. immigration 
relationship testing.  I visited one of those labs, which works with approximately a 
dozen of the U.S.-based AABB-certified labs.  The AABB labs contract with the 
local Haitian facilities to collect the samples and send them to the United States. I 
observed a number of points in the process where vulnerabilities existed that 
could threaten the integrity of the chain of custody.  However, since that time, 
The Department of State (USDOS, 2009) has amended Chapter Nine of its 
Foreign Affairs Manual (9 FAM) to require that all DNA collection overseas take 
place at the U.S. embassy in the presence of a cleared American employee.  
This change should greatly improve the integrity of the chain of custody of DNA 
at all overseas collection locations. 
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS—Visit to Haiti 
What factors might promote the diffusion of innovative DNA 
technology to help USCIS establish identity, protect against immigration 
fraud and human trafficking, and enhance security checks that will protect 
the public against criminals and terrorists? The observations in Haiti 
highlighted the benefits of expanded DNA testing early in the immigration 
process.  Bringing these benefits to light could boost the case to the public; as 
several experts have pointed out, social acceptance is essential to expansion of 
DNA testing.   Most people I spoke with believed legitimate Haitian applicants 
and petitioners would welcome routine DNA testing early in the process.  What 
are the financial incentives and the benefits of up-front DNA testing to 
USCIS stakeholders?  Up-front testing would help applicants verify their claimed 
relationships and process their cases more quickly.  It would deter fraud and 
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human trafficking, including trafficking of children.  DNA testing early in the 
process would also save money and time in file movement and storage, 
interviews, and investigations.  It would enable applicants and petitioners to avoid 
the cost of procuring, translating and delivering fraudulent documents in an 
attempt to meet the documentary requirement when no legitimate document is 
available.  The only down side most people observed to up-front DNA testing 
was that currently DNA testing is very expensive.  Expanded DNA testing, with 
the government controlling it, would greatly reduce costs and increase the 
integrity of the chain of custody.  DNA would also be valuable in screening for 
crime, as many Haitians have already spent time in the United States.  In 
neighboring Dominican Republic, criminals come from all over and pay 
thousands of dollars to obliterate their fingerprints using plastic surgery.  Many do 
this to hide their past crimes and change their identities so they can travel to 
other countries (Singh, 2008).  People cannot alter their DNA, as they can alter 
fingerprints or other biometrics, like iris and face.  What are the legal and 
privacy issues that USCIS must consider, and what policy, regulatory or 
legislative changes are needed? Observations in Haiti highlighted the fact that 
we must change policies and procedures to better control the chain of custody of 
DNA.  We should also allow for DNA testing early in the process, as primary 
evidence of a relationship.   How can interagency collaboration play a role in 
this effort and benefit from it? In Haiti, it was clear that the Department of 
State and USCIS are already cooperating in the limited DNA collection efforts 
currently under way.  Such cooperation is mutually beneficial to both agencies.  
The DOS will enhance the integrity of the DNA collection process with their new 
guidance that requires DNA sample collection to take place in the consular 
section in the presence of a cleared American.  What role might DNA testing 
play in any future comprehensive immigration reform?  In considering 
immigration reform, with some path for regularizing the status of a portion of the 
12 million people who are currently in the United States illegally, one must 
consider people from countries like Haiti.  Haiti is not alone in the world in lacking 
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adequate and reliable legal civil registries.  DNA testing of illegal aliens seeking 
legal status would enable USCIS to lock in a person’s claimed identity, and that 
identity would stay with him from that time on.  If the person claims beneficiaries, 
the DNA could support the claimed relationships.  It could also help to screen the 
applicants for crimes and terrorism, to protect the American public.  Any 
proposed program to regularize status would require careful screening of 
applicants.  DNA is a valuable screening tool that would help to ensure the U.S. 
government does not grant leniency to those who are undeserving.  With Haiti’s 
proximity to the United States, it is likely that many of those applying to regularize 
their status in light of an immigration reform bill may be from Haiti.  A recent 
article estimated that there are currently more than 32,000 Haitians living in the 
United States illegally (Sacchetti, 2009). 
C. NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON THE QHSR 
This year the Department of Homeland Security conducted the first 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR).  The goal was to establish the 
strategic foundation for homeland security activities over the next four years.  
The National Dialogue was a series of three online, interactive conversations in 
which DHS sought to engage stakeholders and other partners in the QHSR 
process.  Participants in the dialogue were able to submit ideas, vote on other 
peoples’ ideas, and provide comments to those ideas.  The possible scores for 
voting ranged from one (poor) to five (excellent).  I took advantage of this 
opportunity to raise the subject of DNA testing and receive public reaction 
through anonymous feedback.  My first submission, on September 3, 2009, 
during the second dialogue, read as follows: 
DNA testing as a condition of filing for an immigration benefit. 
DNA is a valuable tool that would assist DHS in providing the right 
benefits to the right people.  It can establish qualifying biological 
relationships of petitioners, beneficiaries and derivatives, and thus 
prevent alien smuggling while improving customer service to 
legitimate applicants.  It is a unique identifier that can protect 
against impostors and identity theft.  Already, one of the conditions 
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for filing for an immigration benefit is fingerprinting.  DNA profiles 
are the fingerprints of the 21st Century.  Unlike fingerprints, 
however, DNA is easy to collect from persons of all ages.  Its added 
value would enhance the security screening process, enabling DHS 
to determine admissibility and screen out criminals and terrorists. It 
has proven value in solving and preventing crimes.     
 
Why the contribution is important 
DNA testing could enable DHS to meet many of its mission goals 
and objectives.   
Goal 1: Effectively administer our immigration laws and 
efficiently make decisions with fairness and integrity. 
 Make Good, Prompt Decisions -- DNA testing can 
establish qualifying family relationships, meaning that 
decisions can be reached with more certainty, using less 
resources and providing better customer service. 
 Ensure Real-time, Cross-agency Information—Utilizing 
the FBI’s CODIS program, DHS would enhance information-
sharing with local, state, federal and international partners.  
Strict privacy policies such as those already in place would 
protect every person’s privacy. 
Goal 2: Eliminate the conditions that allow and encourage 
aliens to illegally enter and remain in the United States, [to 
include providing tools for employers to ensure a legal 
workforce, while holding accountable those employers who 
violate the laws]. 
 Prevent Fraud—Many applicants and petitioners claim 
qualifying family relationships that actually do not exist.  DNA 
testing will detect the fraud and will ensure that benefits are 
granted only to eligible persons.   
 Eliminate Systemic Vulnerabilities—Relying so heavily on 
paper documents, especially when such documents are 
unavailable or unreliable in many countries, creates 
vulnerability and threatens the integrity of the U.S. 
immigration system. 
Goal 3: Identify, prevent admission, and remove criminal, 
fugitive, dangerous and other removable aliens from the 
United States while providing safe and humane conditions and 
respecting the rights of those in our custody. 
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 Remove Dangerous People—The FBI’s CODIS program 
runs a search of its database on a weekly basis.  If DNA 
from a crime scene is matched to the DNA of a person in the 
DHS DNA database, DHS would work with the appropriate 
law enforcement agencies to apprehend and eventually 
remove the perpetrators. 
 Stop Admission of Dangerous People—Before someone 
is admitted to reside in the United States, a search would be 
conducted of criminal and terrorist DNA databases to rule 
out a match. 
 Utilize International Partners—In our global environment, 
sharing information is essential.  Sources of information-
sharing, such as the INTERPOL DNA Gateway have helped 
to solve crimes around the world. 
 
By the time the dialogue closed this idea had received 9 comments and 14 
votes, which averaged 3.2 points.  The comments varied widely.  Two 
commenters felt U.S. immigration law should expand the definition of “family” to 
include informally adopted children and others who have the equivalent of family 
relationships but may not be blood relatives.  Two of the commenters expressed 
concerns about the costs of DNA testing.  Several commenters pointed out the 
benefits of DNA testing, such as its value in detecting fraud, verifying identity, 
solving cold cases, exonerating the innocent, preserving resources and 
enhancing information sharing.  One person did not actually comment on DNA 
testing, but only expressed an opposition to all immigration.   One person called it 
a “marvelous idea.”  However, from the comments it was hard to tell whether this 
person was being sarcastic or if he or she truly wanted expansion of DNA testing 
beyond what I had suggested. 
For the third and final dialogue, I submitted two ideas.  On September 28, 
2009, I submitted an idea that was nearly the same as the first one outlined 
above, although in somewhat different order, and with “as a Condition of Filing 
for” eliminated from the title. It received 11 comments and 19 votes, with votes 
averaging 2.7 points.  After reading the first seven comments, I realized the 
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commenters might need more information.  Although two of the seven were 
completely in favor of the ideas presented, five of them felt DNA testing was cost 
prohibitive.  Several others expressed their opinions that the current security 
checks were adequate and faster than DNA would be.  One person said DNA 
testing is an invasion of privacy.  On September 30, I submitted the eighth 
comment myself, describing how the costs were coming down, how some people 
spend so much money trying to obtain documents and noting that fraud 
interviews are expensive.  I pointed out those who are unable to pay may request 
fee waivers.  I also pointed out both fingerprints and DNA are needed and useful 
in verifying identity and detecting crime, and criminals sometimes obliterate their 
fingerprints.  Two of the three comments that followed clearly favored the idea of 
DNA testing.  One commenter said she works in an organization where DNA 
testing costs $30 per person.  She does not believe DNA testing is an invasion of 
privacy “as long as it continues to be handled in the confidential manner in which 
it is now.” A third commenter provided information on the United Kingdom Border 
Agency’s DNA testing of asylum seekers.   
To try a different approach, on October 3, 2009 I submitted a more generic 
idea of biometric collection  However, I was careful to include DNA in the tag 
lines.  The idea read as follows: 
Screen using biometrics 
All intending immigrants (maybe even any non-U.S. citizen planning 
to spend more than 90 days in the United States) should be 
screened using all reasonably available biometrics databases, 
including those held by US-VISIT, DoD, DOJ, INTERPOL and 
others. 
 
According to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 24, 
"Biometrics" refers to the measurable biological (anatomical and 
physiological) and behavioral characteristics that can be used for 
automated recognition; examples include fingerprint, face, and iris 
recognition. 
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Why the contribution is important 
This would help to protect us against terrorists, criminals and 
impostors.  Many people use false names to travel and this would 
provide one more layer of defense. 
 
This idea received no comments, but received two votes, averaging four 
points.   
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS—QHSR National Dialogue Results 
What factors might promote the diffusion of innovative DNA 
technology to help USCIS establish identity, protect against immigration 
fraud and human trafficking, and enhance security checks that will protect 
the public against criminals and terrorists?  Overall, the votes averaged out 
to indicate that this was a “good” idea. Most of the negative comments appeared 
to result from a lack of understanding about the costs or a lack of information 
about fraud and the value of fingerprints and DNA.  I did not specifically label the 
last idea submitted as “DNA,” even though I tagged it that way.  Participants 
voted this last one as a “very good” idea.  That may mean people are less 
receptive to DNA than they are to other biometrics.  All of this supports the idea 
that it is imperative to reach out to the public to educate them about the benefits 
and the process and to dispel any myths and fears.   What are the financial 
incentives and the benefits of up-front DNA testing to USCIS stakeholders?  
Some people saw this as a valuable tool to combat fraud and screen for crime.  
One said it would “reduce paper trail clutter as well.”  Many commenters feared 
this would be a costly undertaking, when, really, it should save money in the end. 
One person noted the cost of DNA testing “is many hundreds of dollars per 
person.”  Once people see that the cost can be considerably reduced they may 
change their minds about DNA testing.  What are the legal and privacy issues 
that USCIS must consider, and what policy, regulatory or legislative 
changes are needed? Only one person called DNA testing an invasion of 
privacy. Another person said it is not “an invasion of privacy as long as it 
continues to be handled in the confidential manner in which it is now.” How can 
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interagency collaboration play a role in this effort and benefit from it? Some 
people spoke of DNA’s value in helping law enforcement to solve crimes and in 
exonerating the innocent.  It is clear this would be beneficial to our justice 
system.  One person noted DNA has applications that would be valuable to many 
agencies to enable identification of individuals. What role might DNA testing 
play in any future comprehensive immigration reform?  Some of the 
participants do not appear to want any type of program to regularize the status of 
illegal aliens in the United States, with or without DNA.  Others did not speak 
directly to the immigration reform issue.   
D. EVALUATION OF ACLU COMMENTS ON THE DOJ DNA RULE 
My attempts to arrange an interview with the ACLU to discuss possible 
expansion of DNA testing in the immigration process were unsuccessful.  In an 
effort, however, to gain insight into the ACLU’s concerns with DNA, I reviewed 
their comments to the Department of Justice’s 2008 proposed rule to expand 
DNA testing by federal officers (American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 2008).  
The DOJ rule related mostly to arrested criminals, but also to non-U.S. citizens 
who are detained and fingerprinted.  One major difference between the DNA 
testing in the DOJ rule and the proposed DNA testing for immigration purposes is 
that the DNA testing for immigration purposes would be voluntary.  It is voluntary 
in the sense that the person knows it is one of the requirements and can choose 
to apply for immigration benefits or not.  The DNA testing in the DOJ rule, on the 
other hand, is “forcibly collected,” as pointed out by the ACLU. 
The ACLU objected to the expanded DNA testing, saying, “the collection 
and retention of DNA from innocent people is an unacceptable and unnecessary 
intrusion into their privacy and places them at future risk of being stigmatized or 
discriminated against…”  However, the ACLU’s explanation of how DNA testing 
would stigmatize or discriminate against such people was not clear.  It discussed 
the possibility that the FBI might be able to determine genetic predispositions or 
traits, such as diabetes.  The ACLU did not explain how this might happen, how it 
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would harm the person or why the FBI would want the information in the first 
place.  They also expressed concern about the possibility of expanded “familial 
searching.”  There may be benefits as well as adverse factors surrounding 
familial searching, but a good example of a case in which familial searching was 
valuable was the “BTK” killer (Nakashima, 2008).  Officials were able to identify 
the BTK killer through his daughter’s DNA.  Had they not been able to do so, he 
may have continued to torture and kill innocent people.  
Comments from the ACLU expressed concern that law enforcement may 
take the DNA samples and extract more than the thirteen core loci that the 
current DNA analysis process measures.  The commenter worried that law 
enforcement would try to gain more information, such as insights into disease, 
physical attributes and ancestry.  In the next paragraph, however, the ACLU 
pointed out that Congress had just passed the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, which strictly prohibits misuse of a person’s 
genetic information.  The protections are clearly in place.   
Two of the ACLU’s comments may have merit, but need further 
exploration in the immigration context.  One is the concern with allowing federal 
agencies to contract out DNA collection to multiple agencies or organizations.  
The ACLU pointed out that this may result in inconsistent approaches to handling 
and safeguarding DNA samples.  This is a valid point, but if USCIS expands DNA 
testing for immigration purposes, it is not likely that it would contract it out to 
multiple organizations.  The ACLU suggested destroying the actual DNA samples 
once they have been analyzed.  Although it appears that measures are already in 
place to prevent any misuse of DNA samples, this is a topic that policymakers 
may want to discuss when exploring options for expanded use of DNA testing in 
the immigration process. 
The ACLU also stated that the expanded DNA testing violated the Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, likening it 
to a warrantless search.  However, DNA testing for immigration purposes would 
be voluntary as it would merely be a condition of applying for a benefit.  There 
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would be no expectation of privacy as it relates to DNA testing; instead, the 
expectation would be that it is a required condition of applying for the immigration 
benefit.  The applicant has a choice whether to apply for a U.S. immigration 
benefit or not.  The ACLU spoke about the difference between taking DNA from 
convicted felons versus from those convicted of misdemeanors, and mentioned 
the loss of other rights when convicted of a felony.  However, the ACLU made it 
appear as if submission of DNA is a form of punishment when, in fact, it is a 
crime prevention and identity management tool. 
One of the ACLU’s complaints was that collection from arrestees would 
“exacerbate existing racial bias in the criminal justice system.”  They worried that 
this would increasingly skew the DNA database to include an inordinate number 
of blacks, making them more likely than others to be implicated in future crimes.  
However, DNA would only implicate someone if his DNA were found at a crime 
scene.  On the positive side, DNA might prove a person’s innocence earlier in the 
process when his DNA is already on file.   
If USCIS expands DNA testing for immigration purposes and adds the 
DNA profiles to the national database, this would improve the balance and 
positively alter the current racial skew.  According to the 2008 Yearbook of 
Immigration Statistics (USDHS, 2009), the approximately 12.6 million permanent 
residents in the United States come from a variety of countries, representing 
wide racial variations.  Mexico has the largest representation by far, with 26.9 
percent, or 3.4 million.  The next two countries with the highest number of U.S. 
permanent residents are the Philippines and India.  In fact, out of the top 20 
countries, 7 are from Asia, representing 19.3 percent  of the 12.6 million total, 
and Canada, United Kingdom, Germany and Poland are also in the top 20, 
representing 7.6 percent combined.  Adding all immigrants would bring more 
racial balance to the database.  We would not target certain groups, but instead 




Table 1. Country of Birth of Legal Permanent Resident Population: 2008 
Country of Birth of Legal Permanent Resident Population: 2008 
Legal permanent residents Legal permanent residents 
eligible to naturalize 
Country of 
birth 
Number Percent Number Percent 
Total ......... 12,600,000 100.0 8,160,000 100.0 
Mexico 
........ 
3,390,000 26.9 2,720,000 33.3 
Philippines 
...... 
570,000 4.5 300,000 3.7 
India 
.......... 









420,000 3.3 290,000 3.6 
Cuba 
..........  




340,000 2.7 260,000 3.2 
Canada 
........ 
330,000 2.6 260,000 3.2 
Vietnam 
........ 
330,000 2.6 200,000 2.5 
United 
Kingdom .. 
290,000 2.3 230,000 2.8 
Korea 
......... 
270,000 2.1 170,000 2.1 
Haiti 
.......... 
230,000 1.8 140,000 1.7 
Jamaica 
........ 
230,000 1.8 150,000 1.8 
Colombia 
....... 
220,000 1.7 110,000 1.3 
Germany 
....... 
180,000 1.4 150,000 1.8 
Guatemala 
...... 
180,000 1.4 110,000 1.3 
Poland 
......... 
160,000 1.3 100,000 1.2 
Peru 
.......... 
130,000 1.0 70,000 0.9 
Japan 
......... 
130,000 1.0 100,000 1.2 
Pakistan 
....... 
120,000 1.0 60,000 0.7 
Other 
.......... 
3,700,000 29.4 2,100,000 25.7 
Note: Detail may not sum to totals because of rounding. 
Source: U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 
 
One of the ACLU’s complaints was that the proposed rule would 
disproportionately affect immigrant communities.  The ACLU described the unfair 
registration program implemented after 9/11 that targeted mostly the Middle 
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Eastern population, requiring them to complete a detailed registration process.  
The difference in the proposed program is that USCIS will collect DNA from all 
immigrants who are applying for long-term benefits; it would not target any 
particular group.  The ACLU did not adequately describe the negative impact that 
having their DNA in the database would create for immigrants.  It would have 
very little negative impact on them at all; it would only affect them if they 
committed a crime and left their DNA at the scene.   
In its comments, the ACLU criticized the forcible nature of the DNA testing 
as outlined in the 2008 proposed rule.  As mentioned earlier, this would not be an 
issue in any expanded DNA testing in the immigration process because the DNA 
submission would be voluntary, as a condition of the application for immigration 
benefits.   
The ACLU also commented that expansion of DNA collection to the 
“innocent” (in this case, arrestees and non-U.S.-citizen detainees) is 
unnecessary and unlikely to make us safer.  They believe that such people 
should not be in the database.  They said that adequate procedures are already 
in place for law enforcement to obtain a warrant for DNA or to gather DNA with 
probable cause and exigent circumstances. However, as Michael Smith 
mentioned in a 2006 article, 57 percent of those arrested for rape in a given year 
have never been arrested on a felony charge and 42 percent have never been 
arrested at all.  Many other reports indicate similar findings.  One case that 
highlights how more widespread DNA collection could assist law enforcement is 
that of Deniz Aydiner.  After he brutally tortured, raped and murdered a young 
woman in her dormitory room (Bernstein, 2004), it took police nearly three years 
to bring him to justice, but not for lack of trying.  With no clear suspects, police 
took DNA samples from approximately 500 males in the community before they 
were finally able to identify Aydiner.   
The ACLU noted that the collection and retention of DNA from millions of 
innocent people is unlikely to further the cause of justice.  They said, “As the 
database expands to people convicted of minor offenses or those merely 
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arrested or detained, the chances that any given profile in the database will help 
resolve a future crime diminish.”  To the contrary, many studies have shown the 
value of placing arrestees into the database.  For instance, the City of Chicago 
conducted a study in 2005 that tracked eight criminals.  After their first arrests, 
these eight men went on to commit a combined total of 22 murders, 30 rapes, 1 
attempted rape and 1 aggravated kidnapping.  Had authorities collected DNA at 
the time of the first arrests, they could have prevented the subsequent rapes and 
murders.  Some of the first arrests of these eight men were for crimes such as 
theft, drug possession and burglary.   
Laboratory backlogs were another concern of the ACLU.  They asserted 
that the rule might undermine law enforcement as a result.  However, many law 
enforcement backlogs are due to funding issues.  If USCIS expands DNA testing 
in the immigration process, it would add the costs, which should be minimal, to 
the current biometric fee.  Funding would not be an issue and as long as funding 
is available, they can expand lab capacity to accommodate the need.   
The ACLU pointed out that, because the 2008 DOJ proposed rule 
provided too many exceptions, it failed to clearly specify who would be required 
to provide DNA samples.  This failure to specify, the ACLU asserted, violates due 
process, Congressional intent, the APA (Administrative Procedure Act), and the 
Privacy Act.  The issue is certainly worthy of careful consideration when USCIS 
promulgates rules to expand DNA testing in the immigration process.  However, 
it is unlikely to be a problem because the proposal is to obtain DNA from all 
applicants who are applying for long-term benefits.  Although USCIS makes 
exceptions and often waives fingerprint requirements for such reasons as age or 
amputations, they would not need to make exceptions for DNA collection, as it is 
easy to obtain from persons of all ages, and amputations have no relevance.  
Other concerns that the ACLU raised also merit consideration when 
USCIS develops policies and procedures for expanded DNA testing. The DNA 
testing guidance should clearly specify exactly whom USCIS will test, who will 
conduct the testing, where they will conduct the testing, and what protocols they 
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must follow.  It should also address conditions, such as requiring USCIS to 
capture the photograph, fingerprint and signature at the same time that they 
capture the DNA.  Requiring simultaneous biometric capture would avoid the 
need for people to provide samples multiple times. If USCIS can verify through a 
fingerprint that the person’s DNA is already on file then his DNA will not be 
captured a second time. USCIS will develop rules governing challenges to the 
results or procedures to confirm a match when someone’s DNA matches to a 
crime scene 
Standards were another concern of the ACLU.  It is clear that standards 
must be a priority in any expansion of DNA testing in the immigration arena.   
Finally, the ACLU expressed concern about storage of the actual DNA 
samples.  There may be good arguments for storing them, and there may be 
good arguments against this.  USCIS will have to weigh these issues, with input 
from all stakeholders, and carefully consider them before making a final decision.   
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS—Evaluation of ACLU Comments 
Without the ability to interview a representative from the ACLU, one can 
only presume the answers to the following two questions, based on this 
evaluation. What factors might promote the diffusion of innovative DNA 
technology to help USCIS establish identity, protect against immigration 
fraud and human trafficking, and enhance security checks that will protect 
the public against criminals and terrorists?   USCIS may have an opportunity 
to promote to the ACLU the positive benefits of expanded DNA testing in the 
immigration process.  The ACLU complained that the current DNA database is 
racially skewed because it contains a disproportionate number of blacks.  Adding 
all immigrants would bring more racial balance to the database, so the ACLU 
may see this as a positive.  On the other hand, they may object to the large 
proportion of immigrants in the database.  The ACLU complained about the 
forcible nature of the DOJ-mandated DNA testing.  Since the U.S. government 
does not force anyone to apply for immigration benefits, DNA testing in the 
 95
immigration process would be voluntary. The ACLU complained about the 
possibility of familial testing to solve crimes, but USCIS can point out that familial 
testing has the potential to reunite families.  The ACLU may like the idea that 
DNA testing up front in the process, with costs built into the USCIS fee schedule, 
would especially help refugees, asylees, and those applicants from countries 
where legitimate documents are hard to obtain.  DNA testing will help to speed 
benefits and reduce costs for everyone, and those who cannot afford the 
biometric fee can apply for a fee waiver.  The only applicants it will not help are 
the fraudulent applicants and the criminals.  What are the legal and privacy 
issues that USCIS must consider, and what policy, regulatory or legislative 
changes are needed?  The ACLU is clearly concerned about privacy and other 
Constitutional issues.  USCIS must be just as concerned about such matters.  In 
their comments to the DOJ proposed rule, the ACLU complained that the rule 
violated due process, the APA and the Privacy Act, because it failed to clearly 
specify who will be required to provide DNA samples.  USCIS must build strict 
protocols into any potential DNA program.  They must clearly identify whom they 
will test, how they will protect the data, and how they will use, store and share it. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS / RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. THE BENEFITS ARE CLEAR 
One of the five variables that determine the rate of adoption of innovative 
technology is Perceived Attributes (Rogers, 2003).  Although all biometric 
modalities have merit in establishing identity, DNA has unique attributes in the 
immigration context for several reasons.  One is the fact that no one can alter 
DNA and it does not change over time, as fingerprints, facial features or irises 
might.  Another is that DNA may be easily collected from persons of all ages, 
regardless of physical impairment.  Probably DNA’s greatest value is its utility in 
verifying family relationships that are the qualifying basis for a large portion of 
immigration benefits. Applicants and petitioners would benefit because 
streamlined DNA testing would speed the immigration process and, in many 
instances, help to establish eligibility without the need for documents.   
DNA cannot verify every relationship that USCIS may encounter.  For 
instance, it would not verify a stepparent-stepchild relationship, although verifying 
a group of alleged stepchildren as siblings would help to bolster the stepparent’s 
claim.  If the petitioner is also filing for the children of his or her spouse, USCIS 
can verify the relationship between the spouse and the claimed children.  
Sometimes people attempt to bring nieces or nephews as their children or even 
attempt to bring other people’s children as theirs, with the intent of using them as 
household slaves.  DNA testing would help to stop such practices.  Although the 
government does not often use DNA testing to verify marriage, at times it has 
shown that the alleged husband and wife were actually brother and sister, 
resorting to fraud to bring the sibling to the United States.   
DNA already has proven value in solving and preventing crimes and 
governments are increasingly using it to combat terrorism.  Screening immigrants 
through DNA would protect the American public, enhance national security and 
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protect immigrants against identity theft or false accusations. DNA has other 
benefits as well.  It is useful in disaster recovery.  It could aid in reuniting refugee 
children with their families.  Sometimes in war or other disasters, children are 
split from their families, and later the child and the parent unknowingly travel 
separately to the United States.  DNA has the capability to bring them back 
together.  With all of these attributes, it would seem foolish not to utilize DNA 
technology for immigration purposes. 
B. OUTREACH AND EDUCATION—MESSAGING IS THE KEY 
People fear change.  In order to effect change successfully, especially 
something as innovative and sensitive as DNA testing, the Department of 
Homeland Security must successfully reach out to its stakeholders to convince 
them of the immense benefits that DNA testing will provide.  Through outreach, 
education and skillful presentation, DHS, with the help of expert public relations 
professionals, can dispel the myths and promote the benefits of such change.  
Such social conditioning will pave the way to move forward in this endeavor.  It is 
important for the government to maintain transparency throughout the policy and 
regulatory development process. 
This recommendation, for outreach and education, correlates to three of 
the variables (communication channels, social systems and promotion efforts) 
that Rogers asserts influence the adoption of innovative technology 2003).   
Stakeholders who would benefit from DNA testing in the immigration 
process include the following: 
 Legitimate immigrants and their relatives—DNA testing provides a 
means to prove entitlement to family-based benefits, to show 
admissibility, and to help protect them from identity theft.  It would 
save money and time. 
 DHS components—DNA testing would help USCIS, ICE and CBP 
determine eligibility for benefits and establish admissibility, 
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removability, and eligibility for naturalization.  It would help FEMA 
identify victims in a disaster recovery operation, and save money 
and time.  
 DOJ/FBI and other federal, state, local, and international law 
enforcement partners—DNA testing would help to uniquely identify 
individuals, find missing persons, solve and prevent crimes, and 
protect against terrorism.  It would save time and money and 
enhance information sharing. 
 American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA)—DNA testing 
would help AILA assist clients in establishing eligibility. 
 Health and Human Services (HHS), United Nations High 
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other refugee assistance 
organizations—DNA testing would make the job of resettling 
refugees easier and faster.  They could screen imposters out of the 
process early on and prevent them from traveling to the United 
States.  The legitimate refugees could move to the front of the line.  
This would save time and money and would further humanitarian 
efforts.    
 Advocates for Comprehensive Immigration Reform (CIR)—The 
evidence is not clear, but the inclusion of DNA testing in the 
immigration process may lead to some compromise on this issue.  
Certain groups want stricter enforcement and screening while 
others want some form of amnesty for illegal aliens already in the 
United States.  Perhaps DNA testing, combined with higher 
standards regarding past crimes, would lead to a compromise 




 American Public—DNA testing would prevent imposters from 
availing themselves of benefits that the American taxpayers fund, 
help to protect the public against crime and terrorism, and save 
time and money. 
 The innocent—DNA testing would protect the innocent from being 
wrongfully accused of a crime by exonerating them early on, protect 
them from being victims of a crime or terrorism, and save them time 
and money. 
C. WORKING WITH OUR PARTNERS TO ACHIEVE INTEROPERABILITY: 
STANDARDS FIRST  
Every expert agrees that standards are by far the most important first step 
in establishing an innovative process that will be interoperable and, therefore, 
benefit all partners.  In order for DNA testing in the immigration context to provide 
the most benefit to all, USCIS must consult with numerous partners from the 
outset to ensure that they establish standards and protocols that allow for 
seamless information sharing.  The list of partners should include, but may not 
necessarily be limited to the following: 
 U.S.-VISIT—A component of DHS, US-VISIT uses biometrics to 
help prevent the use of fraudulent documents, protect visitors from 
identity theft and prevent criminals, immigration violators and 
impostors from entering the United States.  US-VISIT already 
successfully manages biometrics for DHS and shares information 
as appropriate with state, local, federal and international partners. 
 FBI—The Federal Bureau of Investigation, a component of the 
Department of Justice, is planning to expand beyond its focus on 
fingerprints to develop a new biometric system that will include 
fingerprints, DNA, facial imaging, palm prints, voice and iris scans 
(Messmer,  2009). 
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 DOS—The Department of State, as the overseas visa-issuing 
authority, must work closely with DHS and USCIS on this project. 
 DoD—The Department of Defense is currently expanding its 
collection of DNA samples overseas.  USCIS should be able to 
search against the DoD database to ensure that an intending 
immigrant has not been involved in violent activity against the 
United States. 
 DHS/S&T—The DHS Science and Technology Directorate is 
currently overseeing research and development projects for rapid 
DNA testing. 
 NSTC—National Science and Technology Council, Executive 
Office of the President.  (Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity 
Management) 
 NIST—the National Institute of Standards and Technology, a 
component of the Department of Commerce.   
 INTERPOL—International Criminal Police Organization 
 Other international partners 
 Note:  American state, local and tribal partners currently follow FBI 
standards. 
D. PRIVACY:  COUPLE ID MANAGEMENT WITH CYBER SECURITY 
In order to ensure the privacy of every person in the DNA database, 
USCIS must take great care to protect it.  The FBI has already demonstrated the 
ability to protect DNA in its database, the National DNA Index System (NDIS) 
and in its program, the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).  Very few people 
actually have access to the information related to the profiles.  Only when there is 
a match to a profile does the agency with the suspect sample contact the agency 
with the match and ask for identification.   
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Likewise, the Department of Homeland Security also already follows strict 
guidelines to protect personally identifiable information (PII).  DHS employees 
currently may utilize password protection or PKI (public key infrastructure) 
technology to protect PII.  However, the sensitive nature of DNA may warrant 
precautions that are more extensive; in fact, it makes sense to use biometrics to 
protect biometric data.  DHS should explore the feasibility of requiring employees 
who access DNA databases to use their own biometrics, such as a single 
fingerprint, in order to access the databases.  This would add a measure of 
control and a level of assurance to those who have submitted DNA samples to 
DHS. 
In pursuing policy or regulatory changes to expand DNA testing in the 
immigration process, the DHS Office of Privacy and the DHS Office of Civil 
Rights and Civil Liberties must play an active role.  USCIS should work closely 
with those offices and carefully develop a privacy impact assessment. 
E. PILOT 
USCIS may not be able to implement DNA testing for every applicant all at 
once.  It would be an overwhelming task, and require USCIS to work out all of the 
potential problems in advance.  It therefore may be wise to implement DNA 
testing gradually, using a trial, or pilot program.  Pilot programs are 
advantageous because they offer the opportunity to implement in phases, and to 
test, evaluate, and adjust the process where necessary (Jowell, 2003).  A DNA 
testing pilot would give USCIS the opportunity to measure the benefits and 
results of the DNA testing.  USCIS could observe the effect on processing times, 
the number of fraudulent applicants or criminals they prevent from entering the 
United States, and the public reaction to the process.   
In selecting the target pilot group USCIS might want to choose those with 
more immediate need than another group for the DNA testing.  For instance, they 
could select people from countries where births are rarely registered, where fraud 
is prevalent, or where we have concerns about terrorism.  USCIS should also 
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attempt to ensure that the target test group has a reasonable racial balance.  For 
instance, USCIS may decide to request DNA testing for all I-730 petitions filed on 
behalf of children.  This means petitions filed by refugees or asylees in the United 
States who wish to gain derivative status for their children, who are usually 
overseas, but sometimes are present in the United States.  Such people come 
from all over the world, but are often from countries where legitimate documents 
are unavailable or where fraud is prevalent.  Alternatively, USCIS may decide to 
conduct DNA testing for all application types from a select but diverse group of 
countries; for example, they may be comprised of those from:  
 Somalia (lack of documents, high fraud rates, terror concern);  
 China (prevalence of high quality fraudulent documents); 
 Yemen (high fraud rate, lack of documents, terror concern); 
 Haiti (lack of documents, high fraud, proximity to the United States). 
No matter what group or groups participate in the pilot, USCIS should 
carefully monitor the results and make any needed improvements to the process.  
There should be a plan for removing DNA profiles from the database should that 
need arise. 
According to Everett Rogers in Diffusion of Innovation (2003), Trialability 
and Observability are two qualities that support more rapid adoption of 
technology.  A pilot DNA testing program as described above would enable DHS 
to first experiment with DNA testing on a limited basis and dispel uncertainty 
about the idea.  The measured results and outcomes would be made available to 
the public. 
F. SUMMARY 
DNA’s many benefits are clear.  Continuing to maintain the status quo, 
where DNA testing is strictly voluntary as a last resort, is not a viable path for the 
future.  USCIS, in its transformation project, aims to move away from 
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overreliance on documents (IBM, 2008); DNA testing could help to accomplish 
that.  Maintaining the status quo prevents USCIS from streamlining the process 
or collecting DNA samples.  That means that a heavy burden will remain on the 
applicants to provide documents and that applicants, petitioners and the 
government will waste precious resources on requests for evidence and lengthy 
fraud interviews. When applicants do wish to submit DNA tests, the costs will be 
high because streamlining and high-volume cost reductions cannot occur.  
Maintaining the status quo leaves the United States vulnerable to fraud 
and to the admission of terrorists and criminals.  It also prevents USCIS from 
accomplishing its humanitarian mission to assist refugees.  The U.S. government 
spends large sums of money every year to screen, interview and process 
refugees, only to discover, after many hours, that some are impostors.  The 2008 
DNA testing pilot showed that alarming numbers of people, much more than 
USCIS has been able to detect without DNA testing, are involved in fraud. 
Because of those findings, the State Department and USCIS temporarily halted 
the refugee family reunification resettlement program (Jordan, 2008). This group 
is least able to meet their burden to prove a relationship and least able to afford 
the costs of DNA testing.  Implementation of DNA testing throughout the 
immigration process would greatly benefit refugees who wish to verify their family 
relationships. 
USCIS should no longer lag behind in the utilization of innovative 
technology to accomplish its mission.  DNA profiles are the fingerprints of the 21st 
Century, and USCIS owes it to the American people to take advantage of DNA 
technology to improve efficiency, protect against fraud and human trafficking, and 
enhance national security.  Standardizing the collection of DNA samples for 
immigration benefits would enable USCIS to meet its goals and objectives as 
outlined in the USCIS Strategic Plan 2008-2012 (USCIS, n.d.). 
In order to utilize DNA technology for immigration purposes, however, the 
government must do several things.  First, through outreach, education and 
skillful presentation, DHS, with the help of expert public relations professionals, 
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can dispel the myths and promote the benefits of such change.  Such social 
conditioning will pave the way to move forward in this endeavor. It is important to 
build trust, and maintaining transparency throughout the policy development 
process will help in this regard.  Part of the public outreach efforts will be to 
assure the public that USCIS will use their private information only for the 
purposes specified and will protect it.  DHS may want to consider utilizing 
biometrics to protect the DNA data.  Another very important thing the government 
should do is invest in standards to achieve interoperability.  This will allow for 
seamless information sharing with local, state, tribal, federal and international 
partners.  Third, the government should consider beginning with a pilot DNA 
testing program.  This would allow USCIS to implement DNA testing in phases, 
and test, evaluate, and adjust the process where necessary. 
Diffusion of DNA testing in the immigration process would streamline 
benefit delivery to legitimate applicants and protect the United States from those 
who threaten our public safety and security. America has the opportunity to be a 
change agent by promoting the expansion of this innovative technology for 
immigration purposes.  One of the five important variables outlined by Rogers as 
key to promoting acceptance of innovative technology is decision makers (2003). 
Our decision makers can seize this opportunity now. 
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